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THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE:
WAITING FOR COURTS TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT PUBLIC POLICY
JUSTIFIES AWARDING DAMAGES TO
THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS WHEN
LIABILITY INSURERS DEAL WITH THEM
IN BAD FAITH
Francis J. Mootz III*
My favorite insurance case has not been decided yet. In fact, the reported
cases cast serious doubt on the possibility that it might be decided in the near
future. There are only hints, asides, and dissenting opinions suggesting that
liability insurers should be held accountable for dealing in bad faith with an
injured third-party who has made a claim against the insured tortfeasor. There
are a number of cases that contain conclusory doctrinal statements that no such
liability exists, but there are very few cases that have directly considered the
public policy question in clear and unambiguous terms. If a court ever consid-
ers this question squarely and decides that public policy justifies awarding
damages to third-party claimants when liability insurers deal with them in bad
faith, that case would certainly qualify as my favorite insurance law case. As
of now, I am waiting patiently.
I don't intend to be difficult, but for purposes of this very interesting Sym-
posium my favorite insurance "case" will be an amalgam of offbeat cases and
dissenting opinions that point the way beyond the stultifying status quo. The
majority of cases either defer this important question or decide the question on
* Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. B.A.
University of Notre Dame; A.M. (Philosophy) Duke University Graduate School, J.D. Duke
University School of Law. I owe many thanks to Dean Peter Glenn for his enthusiastic
support of this and other research projects, which were made possible by the award of a
summer research stipend. I would also like to thank Andrew Tillapaugh, Class of 2002, for
his dedicated research assistance and helpful conversations as I developed this topic, and to
Carrie Leslie, Class of 2002, for research assistance in the final stage of the project. I
received many helpful comments from colleagues when I presented this paper at a faculty
colloquium, and I especially wanted to thank my colleague, Mike Navin, for his spirited
critique of my thesis. Tom Baker provided some incisive comments, suggestions, and
criticisms in an effort to strengthen my thesis, for which I am grateful. Hoyd Wilson of
McCary, Wilson, & Pryor, P.C. in Albuquerque, New Mexico provided extensive comments
"from the trenches" that I found very helpful. Most important, I am grateful to Jeff Stempel
for his very helpful comments on a draft and for his kind invitation to join in this project and
to have the honor of submitting these thoughts alongside the essays of a distinguished group
of insurance law scholars and practitioners.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
technical or narrowly circumscribed doctrinal grounds that do not permit full
consideration of the issue. Because the essay format of this Symposium does
not permit me to provide a detailed doctrinal and policy analysis, I propose
only to put the issue of insurers' duties to third-party claimants on the table. To
facilitate discussion of this broad topic, I will focus on the manner in which the
California courts have handled this question, culminating in the recent decision
of the Court of Appeals in Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.'
My modest goal in these few pages is to justify my choice of a case that does
not yet exist as my "favorite" insurance law case. In the spirit of the Sympo-
sium, I conclude this essay with an appendix that offers an example of how my
favorite insurance case might read, should it ever be written.
I. WHY COURTS SHOULD HOLD THAT PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS INSURERS
FROM DEALING WITH INJURED THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS IN
BAD FAITH
Imagine the Patsy family, pulling up to an intersection in their minivan on
a Sunday morning trip to a favorite breakfast spot. The traffic signal is red and
the car comes to a complete stop. The day is bright and clear. There is little
traffic. Vision on the street is unobstructed. Without warning, a pickup truck
driving thirty-five miles per hour slams into the back of the Patsy minivan,
pushing it into the middle of the intersection where it is struck immediately by
crossing traffic. All members of the Patsy family sustain serious injuries that
require hospitalization. Ima Patsy is unable to work for two months. Ben A.
Patsy is unable to work for six months. Both children are traumatized severely
by the accident.
The negligent driver of the pickup truck has an insurance policy with Fam-
ily Insurance Bureau (FIB), a national insurer. The Patsy family has very little
in the way of insurance protection for health and disability risks, and they
immediately begin to suffer financial distress as a result of the accident. After
getting nowhere with FIB's claims department, the family retains a local attor-
ney to sue FIB for their injuries. FIB initially contends that its investigation
has shown that the brake lights on the Patsies' minivan did not work, that they
had negligently remained stopped in the road even though the stoplight had just
changed to green, and that the parents both had preexisting injuries that are not
compensable. After two years of fruitless negotiations and delaying tactics in
the civil lawsuit, discovery finally establishes that FIB's contentions have little
or no basis in fact and that they contradict what its own insured has told them
about the accident. Only at this point does FIB agree to pay a sharply dis-
counted amount on the Patsies' claim, from which the Patsies' attorney will
subtract her fee. Only later will the Patsies learn that FIB has been following a
corporate policy designed to settle claims for less than market value.
The Patsy family is all too eager to accept the low settlement, because
their lives are now in financial ruin. The mortgage company's patience has
worn thin, and "repo man" has made several visits to their house. The settle-
ment check arrives after deduction for court costs and their attorney's fee.
I Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 28 Cal. App. 4th 185 (1994).
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There is little sense of vindication. There is little sense of justice. There is
only anger and a sense of betrayal. The Patsies' attorney files a complaint with
the State Insurance Commissioner. Amazingly enough, the Commissioner
investigates the matter and decides to sanction FIB for its behavior in this case
and several others. This "victory" is against the bureaucratic odds, but never-
theless the Patsy family receives no compensation as a result of this administra-
tive proceeding. They remain uncompensated victims of FIB's behavior.
The straightforward question posed by this hypothetical scenario is
whether FIB should be held liable to the Patsy family for the harms caused by
its claim settlement practices, even if such liability extends beyond the scope of
coverage under its insured's automobile policy and outside the applicable limits
of that coverage. The courts in this country generally have settled on a straight-
forward answer: "No." This response is unacceptable.
I begin with the premise that the great majority of insurers that offer third-
party protection are reputable businesses that conduct their affairs honestly and
fairly. But there are always cases, whether they represent the business strategy
of a rogue insurer or an aberration in the otherwise legitimate claim handling
process of a reputable insurer, in which an insurer's callous delay and stone-
walling tactics cause substantial harm to innocent third-party claimants. There
is no sound reason to insulate insurers from liability for causing additional
injury to the injured claimants. There are only doctrinal "truths" that straight-
jacket courts from acknowledging what otherwise should be obvious principles
of liability.
Insurers rightfully worry about insurance fraud, and they work hard to
ensure that this destructive behavior is punished by force of law. The essence
of insurance fraud is an attempt by a claimant to obtain more from the insur-
ance contract than the claimant is entitled to receive. In this essay I will argue
that the state should also aggressively police what I believe is aptly described
as "reverse insurance fraud." I use the term "reverse insurance fraud" to
describe a situation in which an insurer stonewalls payment to a third-party
claimant in bad faith, which is to say solely for the purpose of minimizing its
financial payments on the claim and without any legal justification relating to
questions of liability or the measure of damages. Reverse insurance fraud is no
less fraudulent than the usual cases of insurance fraud, because the insurer is
attempting to secure unbargained-for benefits under the insurance contract with
its insured. When an insurer seeks to retain funds that it contractually has
promised to pay to an injured party without any good faith basis - which is to
say, solely to benefit its own financial interests by browbeating the injured
party into relinquishing part of a legitimate claim - then the integrity of the
insurance contract is subject to a fraud no less than when a claimant makes
false claims of soft tissue injury to increase the claimant's recovery. Fraudu-
lent overreaching is fraudulent overreaching. Of course, it might be argued that
it is more blameworthy for a large and sophisticated corporation to engage in
such bad faith behavior, but simple parity in punishing fraud is an appropriate
starting point.
The reasons for holding liability insurers accountable for bad faith actions
that injure the third-party claimant should be obvious. First, an administrative
proceeding devoted to regulating industry behavior in the aggregate is not well
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suited to preventing this behavior, since an insurer could selectively engage in
this behavior without much fear of sanction. Moreover, avoiding future harms
to the general public through administrative oversight does not correct the inju-
ries already caused to individual third-party claimants. Finally, the public
interest in preventing such harms might be much better protected through a
system of liability to individual third-party claimants than by using the regula-
tory instrumentalities of the administrative state, since imposing the true costs
of this behavior on the insurer would likely provide a stronger disincentive than
the threat of administrative sanction.
Admittedly, the arguments against holding liability insurers accountable
for bad faith settlement practices are equally obvious. First, these parties do
not have a contractual relationship; rather, they essentially act as adversaries in
negotiations and litigation. In this setting it is peculiar, to say the least, to talk
of duties owed by the insurer to a claimant. Second, creating the potential for
large verdicts against the insurer after the litigation against the insured has been
resolved might lead to uneconomic decisions by the insurer to settle matters
quickly, drawing into greater question the entire tort liability system and poten-
tially increasing the cost of insurance. Finally, one might question how there
can be "bad faith" when the insurance contract does not obligate the insurer to
pay sums until such time as there is a settlement or a judgment against its
insured.
The only means to resolve the competing arguments, of course, is to bal-
ance and mediate the competing considerations. It would be foolish for courts
to adopt a "quasi-fiduciary" standard of behavior for liability insurers, given the
adversarial context in which they deal with claimants. But it is equally foolish
to impose no duty on liability insurers, given the enormous public interest in
the tort-insurance system as an effective means of compensating injured par-
ties. Given these competing considerations, it seems prudent to suggest that the
courts should police bad faith behavior by insurers rather than attempting to
articulate detailed affirmative duties of good behavior that insurers must follow
when dealing with claimants. Case-by-case adjudications of bad faith behavior
would permit claimants to recover for harm caused when an insurer attempts to
retain benefits that the insured has contractually purchased to compensate the
claimant.
I do not write on a clean slate. Before moving to a discussion of the state
of the law after Krupnick, it is necessary to provide an historical overview of
the context in which this question now arises. In Part Two of the essay, I
review the traditional doctrinal rejection of any theory of liability and the sub-
sequent movement by state courts to imply a private cause of action in favor of
third-party claimants under statutory and regulatory schemes targeting unfair
insurance practices. As adopted in California in Royal Globe,2 this implied
private cause of action appeared to address the question of insurer liability to
third-party claimants directly. However, dissatisfaction with the Royal Globe
approach led California to reverse course and refuse to grant rights to third-
party claimants, bringing it back in line with the great majority of states.3 It
2 Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Butte County, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
3 Thirty-one states have rejected the Royal Globe strategy of interpreting state unfair claims
practices acts to provide an implied cause of action for third-party claimants. Eight states
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now is almost universally true that unfair claims practices statutes will not
effectively provide third-party claimants with compensation if insurers deal
with them in bad faith, absent an explicit provision.
After reviewing Royal Globe and its demise, I assess the current state of
the law in Part Three. When overturning Royal Globe, the California Supreme
Court acknowledged the possibility that a third-party claimant might have tort
claims against an insurer for its unfair settlement and litigation practices. How-
ever, the courts have been unable to articulate a sound basis for developing this
private law remedy for third-party claimants, owing largely to the fact that the
historical attempt to imply private causes of action under a regulatory statute
has skewed the analysis. In Part Four, I argue that courts must reconceptualize
the public policy basis for holding that liability insurance carriers will incur tort
liabilities if they deal with third-party claimants in bad faith. Once properly
grounded, the public policy tort of engaging in bad faith settlement practices
toward third-party claimants fits well into traditional doctrinal categories.
I conclude this essay with an Appendix, in which I suggest how a judicial
opinion that endorses my approach might read. My goal is to persuade rather
expressly rejected the reasoning of the Royal Globe case. See White v. Unigard Mut. Ins.
Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1020-21 (Idaho 1986); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718,
723-25 (Ill. App. 1979); Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa
1982); Earth Scientists v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-71 (D. Kan. 1985);
Tweet v. Webster, 610 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D. Nev. 1985); Patterson v. Globe Am. Cas. Co.,
685 P.2d 396, 397-98 (N.M. 1984); A&E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798
F.2d 669, 673-75 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia law); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co.,
307 N.W.2d 256, 269 (Wisc. 1981). Twenty-three states rejected the result reached in Royal
Globe in the context of the particularities of their own statutory scheme. See Young v.
Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Mich. App. 1984); Morris v. Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 234-38 (Minn. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Lawton v. Great S.W.
Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978); Pierzga v. Ohio Cas. Group, 504 A.2d 1200,
1204 (N.J. Super. 1986); Farmer's Union Cent Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp.
1534, 1536 (D.N.D. 1987); Strack v. Westfield Cos., 515 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986); Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-23 (Ore. 1978); D'Ambrosio v.
Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 969-70 (Pa. 1981), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (1990); Swinton v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 495,
496-97 (S.C. 1984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 146-49 (Tex. 1994); Wil-
der v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt. 1981); Tank v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 686 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 715 P.2d
1133 (Wash. 1986); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 492 (Wyo. 1992).
Two states embraced the Royal Globe approach, but in both states the courts held that a
third-party claimant must meet the statutory requirement of proving more than a single viola-
tion in order to recover. See Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Mont. 1983); Jenkins v.
J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 259-60 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on other
grounds, State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994).
A district court interpreted Nevada's unfair claims practices act to provide an implied
cause of action for insureds, but this interpretation relied heavily on the Nevada legislature's
decision to grant express rights to insureds in an amendment to the act subsequent to the
accrual of the cause of action. See Crystal Bay Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1371, 1376-77 (D. Nev. 1989).
Finally, Kentucky permits a cause of action by third-party claimants for violations of
the unfair claims practices act, but it finds the source of the cause of action in another statute
that provides for a remedy for violations of any state statute that does not foreclose a civil
remedy or provide its own civil remedy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763
S.W.2d 116, 117-18 (Ky. 1988).
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than to demonstrate. There is no doctrinal truth that is logically compelled;
there is no "single right answer" that I brilliantly deduce. I claim only that my
suggestion that liability insurers bear some measure of duty toward third-party
claimants is a sound position that can be justified with traditional legal analysis.
The courts have repeatedly shown that the opposite conclusion also can be jus-
tified with traditional legal analysis. The question is which analysis better
accommodates contemporary understandings of the business of insurance, the
public interests at stake, and the equities relating to the parties affected. My
goal in writing a hypothetical judicial opinion is to persuade the reader to
endorse my position.
II. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF ROYAL GLOBE: THE JUDICIAL CREATION OF
AN IMPLIED STATUTORY REMEDY FOR BAD FAITH
SETTLEMENT PRACTICES
A. The Baseline Common Law Rule: Liability Carriers Owe No Duty to
Injured Third-Party Claimants
As a general rule, courts hold that liability carriers owe no duty to injured
third-party claimants. The doctrinal analyses usually embrace two general
themes. First, courts hold that a third-party claimant has no special relationship
with the insurance carrier that gives rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Second, courts hold that a third-party claimant has no contractual rights against
a liability insurer, even when claiming rights as a third-party beneficiary. In
both instances, the courts contrast the third-party claimant with the insured,
who has a contractual relationship with the insurance carrier and also enjoys the
protections of a judicially-created heightened duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
Courts traditionally have found that liability insurance carriers do not owe
a duty of good faith to third-party claimants, distinguishing the court-created
rule that liability carriers owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to their
insured to resolve the dispute within the policy limits. In an older case, the
Georgia Court of Appeals provided a classic statement of the rationale that
established the baseline rule of the common law:
While an automobile liability insurance company may be held liable for damages to
its insured for failing to adjust or compromise a claim covered by its policy of insur-
ance, where the insurer is guilty of negligence or of fraud or bad faith in failing to
adjust or compromise the claim to the injury of the insured ... it does not follow that
a person injured by the insured and who is not a party to the insurance contract may
complain of the negligence or bad faith of the insurer towards its policyholder in
failing to adjust or compromise a claim against such policyholder, for the duty of the
insurance company to use ordinary care and good faith in the handling of a claim
against its insured arises out of the relationship between the insurer and the insured
created by the contract or policy of insurance, and there is no fiduciary relationship
or privity of contract existing between the insurer and a person injured by one of its
policyholders.
4
This rationale obviously protected insurers who played hardball with
third-party claimants in the settlement process. Thus, in response to a plain-
4 Francis v. Newton, 43 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947).
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tiff s suit alleging that a carrier stonewalled payments in a case of clear liability
and documented damages simply because the claimant resided in Maine and
the accident occurred in the insured's state of North Carolina (thereby imposing
practical obstacles and inconveniences to bringing suit), the court found no
basis for recovery.
That the defendant may have acted in a manner which may hae brought into play
plaintiffs economic circumstances as pressure upon plaintiff to settle for an amount
less than plaintiff believed his case was really worth does not constitute duress in
legal contemplation, either to vitiate the settlement which was made or create an
independent cause of action for damages.
5
Similarly, in response to a plaintiffs allegations that an insurance carrier
was categorically denying claims involving soft tissue injury in cases where
property damage was less than $1000, irrespective of the merits of the individ-
ual case, the Arizona Court of Appeals recently held that the insurer simply had
no duties to the claimant during the settlement and litigation process.6
Along with many courts,7 California has embraced the rule that there is no
duty of good faith owed by liability insurers to third-party claimants. In Zahn
v. Canadian Indemnity Co., a married couple injured in an auto accident
alleged that the carrier improperly and unreasonably refused to settle the hus-
band's claim unless his wife agreed to settle her claim against the insured
simultaneously.' The court rejected their attempts to claim protection under the
cases establishing that insurance carriers owe an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing in settlement negotiations to their insureds, holding that nowhere
in those cases is there any mention of a duty to the adversary in the litigation between
the injured party and the insured to settle the former's claim against the latter ...
[The claimant has no] right to require the insurer to negotiate or settle with him prior
to the establishment of the insured's liability ... 9
The doctrinal starting point for analysis, then, is that an insurance carrier
owes duties to its insured that may give rise to tort liability, but in the claim
settlement and litigation process it owes no duties to the injured third party
claimant. 'o
5 Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Me. 1977).
6 Leal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 P.3d 95, 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
7 See, e.g., Brown v. Candelora, 708 A.2d 104, 113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (extended string
cite of jurisdictions rejecting third-party claimant rights); Dvorak v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 332 (N.D. 1993); Bowman v. Charter Gen. Agency, Inc., 799 S.W.2d
377, 380-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Liimatta v. Lukkari, 460 N.W.2d 251, 252 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); Yelm v. Country
Mut. Ins. Co., 259 N.E.2d 83, 84 (I11. App. 1970).
8 Zahn v. Canadian Indem. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287 (Ct. App. 1976).
9 Id. at 288.
10 This rule is limited to the claim settlement and litigation period, however. Courts have
recognized that when an injured third-party claimant obtains a verdict against an insured, and
thereby triggers the insurance carrier's contractual duty to pay the damages on behalf of the
insured, the claimant may maintain a direct action against the carrier for the policy proceeds.
Therefore, in Zahn the court emphasized that no duty was owed until the contingency of
establishing the insured's liability with a judgment was met. Id. at 288. See also Hand v.
Farmer's Ins. Exch., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 264-67 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the claimant
becomes a judgment creditor entitled to enforce the insurance contract as a third-party bene-
ficiary and also subrogates to the insured's special relationship with the carrier, and distin-
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Courts justify this position by noting that an insurer's breach of the duty to
its insured to settle a case does not injure the third-party claimant, but rather
benefits that claimant by making additional funds available to satisfy the excess
verdict. In the unanimous opinion in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co., the
California Supreme Court spoke definitively on the issue:
Unlike a failure to investigate the representations of the insured, a breach of the duty
to settle does not involve the risk that a person injured by a negligent motorist will
fail to receive the compensation called for by that law. Breach of the duty to settle
will, if anything, allow the injured party to recover the amount of the offered settle-
ment, perhaps an additional sum to the extent of the policy limits, and sums in excess
of those limits from the negligent motorist. Because an insurer's refusal to accept a
reasonable settlement does not diminish the injured claimant's recovery, the policy of
compensating persons injured by a negligent motorist is not frustrated.'
Courts repeatedly make the same point: the insurer's breach of its good
faith settlement duties actually benefits the third-party claimant, and thus can-
not give rise to direct tort liability to the claimant. 2
Given the unavailability of tort liability for bad faith settlement practices,
some claimants have premised their claims against insurers on contract princi-
ples. A third-party claimant obviously has no contract with the liability insurer,
but claimants have argued that they should have the rights of third-party benefi-
ciaries since the purpose of the insurance contract is for the carrier to make
payments to the claimant. However, courts begin with the fact that an insur-
ance contract is in the nature of an indemnity contract: the insurer has no obli-
gation to pay sums to the claimant until such time as the insured becomes
legally obligated to make such payments. Thus, in Zahn, the California Court
of Appeals held that third-party beneficiary rights do not arise under a liability
insurance contract until the insured's liability is established by an adverse judg-
ment.' 3 Courts generally conclude that the insurance policy is intended to ben-
efit only the insured and is not intended to benefit the claimant, at least until the
insured suffers a judgment.14 Although the Florida Supreme Court unani-
mously reached the opposite conclusion in holding that a claimant could use
guishing this situation from the general rule that a liability carrier has no duties to a third-
party claimant prior to judgment); D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., Inc. v. Am. Home Assur-
ance Co., 502 N.E.2d 694, 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (Markus, P.J., concurring) (concluding
that an injured party has no right in the insurance policy until such time as a verdict against
the insured triggers the carrier's duty to indemnify, at which time the carrier may owe a duty
of good faith to the injured third party).
" Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 429 (1976).
12 Murray v. Mossman, 355 P.2d 985, 987 (Wash. 1960); Biasi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249
A.2d 18, 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969); Yelm v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 259 N.E.2d
83, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979); Brown v. Candelora, 708 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa. Super. 1998). See generally Robert E.
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAev. L. REv. 1136, 1176
(1954) ("Not only is company without any duty to claimant to accept claimant's reasonable
settlement offer, but also, if there is a sizable disparity between the settlement offer and the
amount of the judgment obtained in the trial which follows refusal of the offer, claimant is
benefited [sic] rather than harmed by company's refusal to settle.").
1 Zahn, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 288. See also Rowlands v. Phico Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1092134, at
*5 (D. Del. July 27, 2000) (citing cases).
14 See, e.g., Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 339, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Chapell v.
LaRosa, 2001 WL 58057, at *2-4 (Conn. Super. Jan. 5, 2001).
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third-party beneficiary principles to sue for the excess judgment after the
insurer engaged in bad faith, 5 this case appears to be an anomaly. 16 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court later limited its holding dramatically by explaining that it
utilized third-party beneficiary principles only to obviate the need for a claim-
ant to receive an assignment of the insured's bad faith rights after judgment,
and not in recognition of any obligations owed by the insurer directly to the
third-party claimant.' 7
It is safe to conclude that an insurance carrier owes no duties to the claim-
ant under third-party beneficiary contract principles prior to the claimant
obtaining a judgment against the insured, nor does the carrier owe heightened
duties of good faith and fair dealing to the claimant during the settlement and
litigation process, except to the extent that the insured may assign its rights to
the claimant in satisfaction of an excess verdict. Courts generally justify these
doctrinal positions by noting that it would be curious to afford any rights to the
claimant under tort or contract since the insurance carrier steps into the shoes of
the insured as the adversary of the claimant. In the words of one court, "An
insurer can hardly have a fiduciary relationship both with the insured and a
claimant because the interests of the two are often conflicting." 18 Simply put,
the "insurer has a fiduciary duty to the insured but an adversary relationship
with the victim."19 In light of the conflict of interest between the insured and
the claimant, one court stated that the insurer has the "right" to force the claim-
ant to trial to prove his case, even if the plaintiff alleges that the insurer is
offering only nominal settlements in order to capitalize on the practical difficul-
ties that the claimant may face in bringing suit in a distinct venue.20 The claim-
ant may obtain an assignment of the insured's common law rights against the
insurance carrier, but the courts almost unanimously 21 insist that the claimant
cannot assert any such rights without an assignment. 22 If an insured refuses to
5 Thompson v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971).
16 See Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 492 (Wyo. 1992) ("The third-party-beneficiary argu-
ment has been rejected by virtually every court to address the issue, and we join those courts
today.") (citations omitted); Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Auto. Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 893,
901 (W. Va. 1998); Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 339, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980);
Murray v. Allstate Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 247, 249-50 (N.J. Super. 1986); Biasi v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 249 A.2d 18, 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
17 Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Cope, 462 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1985) (emphasizing that it did
not create a duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to a third-party claimant, but rather that
the "basis for an action remained the damages of an insured from the bad faith action of the
insurer which caused its insured to suffer a judgment for damages above his policy limits.
Thompson merely allowed the third party to bring such an action in his own name without an
assignment.").
18 O.K. Lumber Co., Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 526 (Alaska 1988).
'9 Chapell, 2001 WL 58057, at *4 n.2 (quoting Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa
1992)).
20 Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Me. 1977).
21 As related above, Florida recognizes a claimant's right to assert the insured's rights
against the carrier for bad faith settlement practices, even in the absence of an express
assignment. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
22 Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 429 (1976).
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assign its rights or cannot be located by the claimant, the claimant is without a
remedy.23
The striking thing about these common law decisions is that they rest on
the desire of courts to maintain doctrinal consistency rather than to achieve
public policy goals or to avoid harm. The typical court opinion rejects the idea
of a duty owed by liability insurers to third-party claimants after cataloguing
various legal theories and finding them all wanting. It is a rare case2 4 that
suggests that there would be harmful consequences if the law recognized that
an injured third-party claimant would have a direct claim against an insurance
carrier that acted in bad faith toward that person during the claims process; the
cases tend only to hold that the law does not recognize such a duty under tradi-
tional legal principles. A recent case, Campbell v. American International
Group, Inc. ,25 underscores this important point. Two soldiers stationed in Ger-
many were involved in an auto accident, but the claimant sued after they
returned to the United States in the tortfeasor's home state of Oklahoma.
Under applicable German law, the liability carrier could be sued directly as
jointly liable for the claimant's injuries. The insurer objected, citing the well-
recognized policy in Oklahoma that a liability carrier owes no duties to the
claimant until judgment is entered. However, the court concluded that this rule
was doctrinal, rather than a matter of fundamental public policy, and therefore
enforced the applicable German statute.26
23 See Murray v. Mossman, 355 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Wash. 1960) ("The [claimants] are try-
ing to enforce a chose-in-action for [the insured], which [the insured] does not believe exists
or is unwilling to enforce"); Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 339, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980) (rejecting an exception to the general rule when the claimant uses reasonable efforts to
locate the insured in order to obtain an assignment but is unsuccessful). See also Rowlands
v. Phico Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1092134, at *5 (D. Del. July 27, 2000) ("Without an assignment,
Rowlands has no standing to bring these claims."). In Brown v. Candelora, the court held
that public policy precluded a direct action by the claimant because the insured would be
deprived of its right to maintain an action against the insurer to make himself whole as to
damages such as his own increased attorney's fees. 708 A.2d 104, 112-13 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998). The dissenting judge challenged this rationale:
Requiring a formal assignment can completely frustrate the bad faith claim. If the insured never
granted the assignment, the insurer could benefit from its bad faith actions. Similarly, an insurer
could agree to settle a bad faith claim with its insured for substantially less than the verdict
amount. This type of action could create a process which protects an insurer who engages in bad
faith conduct. In short, I can perceive of no reason to require an express assignment .... In a
garnishment proceeding, the injured party is only entitled to receive that portion of the "bad
faith" damages necessary to satisfy the judgment. The insured is free to maintain an action for
its damages, i.e., attorney fees, beyond the judgment sum.
Id. at 116 (Del Sole, dissenting).
24 I have found one case that makes this public policy claim, but it does so only in dicta and
in a very conclusory manner. See Biasi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 A.2d 18, 21 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1969) (baldly asserting that "public policy does not mandate that the injured party in the
accident should be deemed the intended beneficiary of the company's contractual duty to its
policyholder to act in good faith regarding settlement"), reaffirmed in Murray v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 507 A.2d 247, 250 (N.J. 1986).
25 976 P.2d 1102 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999).
26 The court reasoned:
We have never before recognized the right of a plaintiff to bring a direct action against the
insurer of an alleged tortfeasor absent statutory edict. Herein, the applicable German law seems
just such a statutory edict .... Therefore, we see nothing repugnant to Oklahoma law in recog-
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Although courts have concluded as a general matter that an insurer owes
no common law obligations to the third-party claimant in the handling of the
claim, there are specific scenarios that might give rise to liability on more nar-
row grounds. For example, an insurer might be found liable for making fraudu-
lent statements to a claimant during the settlement process. In Chavez v.
Chenoweth27 the claimant in an automobile negligence case alleged that the
insurer admitted its insured's fault and advised her not to retain an attorney
because they "would take care of all her damages and give her reasonable com-
pensation for her injuries." The claimant sued when the insurer made no pay-
ments after she delayed for some time in retaining an attorney. The court noted
that the claimant was not owed a generalized duty of good faith, but it con-
cluded that she had sufficiently alleged fraud, as well as breach of an oral con-
tract to pay the insurance benefits.2 8
Fraud cases generally do not work well for claimants, however, because
the fact that they have finally retained an attorney and are pursuing their rights
leads some courts to conclude that there was no reliance on the fraudulent state-
ments.29 Moreover, in light of the "adversarial" nature of the relationship
between the parties, courts appear willing to provide a great deal of leeway to
insurers. In a recent case, after being rear-ended in an automobile accident, the
claimant was advised that the insurer would deal with him fairly and therefore
that he did not need an attorney, and he received a letter stating in detail that
the insurer would treat the claimant like its own customer.30 In fact, the claim-
ant alleged, the insurer offered a low-ball settlement offer as part of a pre-
existing systematic effort to reduce soft-tissue injury payouts. 31 The court held
that the pleadings did not support a theory that by its affirmative conduct the
insurer assumed a duty that otherwise would not exist, concluding that:
Allstate's "Customer Service Pledge" did not promise a fair settlement nor did it
promise to treat the Leals as insureds. It promised only to consider them as "custom-
ers" and to provide "quality customer service." ... Nowhere did Allstate promise to
make a fair settlement or to give equal consideration to the Leal's interest, as the duty
of good faith would require....
[T]he Leals did not give up control of the settlement of their claim nor of
their freedom of action. Nothing in the Customer Service Pledge deprived
them of any and all remedies against Allstate's insured or against Allstate itself
if the insured assigned any bad faith claims he might have. Allstate did not
even promise to pay the Leal's claim; it promised only to discuss fair payment.
All of Allstate's promises together did not create [a] fiduciary-like relationship
32
nizing and enforcing Germany's "statutory edict" that automobile liability insurers are jointly
and severally liable with tortfeasors and may be sued by injured parties.
Id. at 1107.
27 Chavez v. Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703, 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
28 Id.
29 Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Me. 1977); Dvorak
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 332 (N.D. 1993).
30 Leal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 P.3d 95, 96-97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 98-99.
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When considered against the backdrop of doctrinal analyses that charac-
terize the insurance carrier and third-party claimant as adversaries, claims that
the insurer engaged in fraud during the settlement process become all the more
difficult to establish.
A third-party claimant challenged this same systematic practice of denying
legitimate claims by alleging that the insurer abused the legal process. In an
unreported case, an Arizona jury awarded $15,000 compensatory damages to a
claimant for the emotional distress caused by the insurer's hardball tactics in a
minor-injury insurance claim. 33 Although defense counsel claimed victory in
light of the plaintiff's claim for $500,000 compensatory damages and unspeci-
fied punitive damages, the case is reportedly the first instance of a liability
insurer being found liable under this theory. If the case survives the expected
appeal it will provide a means of challenging express corporate decisions to
pursue a "scorched earth litigation strategy" in order to increase insurer profits.
However, courts generally have dismissed cases alleging equally egregious
facts, concluding that claimants are barred as a matter of law from suing liabil-
ity carriers under a theory of "maliciously defending" the litigation. 34 Given
the narrow pleading and proof requirements for the tort of abuse of process and
the baseline doctrinal rule regarding carrier liability to claimants, it is unlikely
that this tort will serve as an effective general vehicle for policing insurer bad
faith.
One final potential avenue of recovery is opened when the third-party
claimant is insured by the same carrier that insures the tortfeasor. In this situa-
tion, claimants have argued that they have the requisite contractual relationship
with the insurer to trigger a duty of good faith and fair dealing. However,
courts have consistently held that the claimant can assert a claim only if the
carrier has breached a duty owed to the claimant under the claimant's policy,
and do not recognize any duty owed by the carrier under the tortfeasor's policy
toward the insured simply because the insured has a separate policy with the
same carrier. For example, an insurer was liable to a claimant wife who was a
co-insured with her tortfeasor husband under an automobile policy when the
insurer promised that it would provide her with all available funds under her
policy, but did not advise her that she could sue her husband for damages under
the liability portion of that policy.3 5 However, when a co-insured wife sues her
tortfeasor husband for damages, the courts generally do not recognize any
duties owed by the carrier to the claimant wife under the liability portion of the
11 See Rebecca Porter, Jury Punishes Allstate for "Scorched-Earth" Tactics, 37 TRIAL 70
(Dec. 2001); David Hechler, Allstate found liable for Abuse of Process, NAT'L LAW J., Oct.
22, 2001, at A15.
" See Rowlands v. Phico Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1092134 (D. Del. July 27, 2000) and cited
cases. In Rowlands, the medical malpractice plaintiff alleged that the liability carrier never
notified the defendant doctor of the suit, nor secured his participation, and then only at the
last minute before trial it disclaimed liability under the policy provision requiring the insured
to cooperate in the defense of the action. Id. at * 1. The court concluded that Phico owed no
contractual or tort duties to Rowland during the litigation, and that she was limited to rights
she could obtain by assignment from the (still missing) defendant doctor. Id. at *5.
35 Dercoli v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1989).
[Vol. 2:443
THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE
policy.36 The distinction between breach of a duty owed to a claimant in her
insured capacity, versus finding that an insurer owes no duties to an insured in
her capacity as a third-party claimant, is a consistent theme in the case law.3 7
The cases strongly suggest that there is no common law basis for imposing
liability on liability carriers when they deal with third-party claimants in bad
faith. In many respects, it is difficult to quarrel with these cases. There is good
reason to reject a third-party beneficiary theory under general principles of con-
tract law, and there is equally good reason to refuse to extend the heightened
duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to an insured to a third-party claimant.
The fact that there may also be good reason to change these doctrinal rules does
not mean that there is a compelling argument against the traditional approach.
Even if the common law rule requiring claimants to obtain an express assign-
ment of rights before seeking to garnish the excess judgment in the hands of the
carrier who has acted in bad faith toward its insured makes little sense when
considering the real world contexts in which these claims arise,38 this doctrinal
point regarding the ability to assert the insured's rights is not directly pertinent
to the question of a third-party claimant's right to proceed directly against an
36 Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381, 383-84 (Utah 1999) (distinguishing the Dercoli case,
supra note 3). In another case involving a similar set of facts, the court reasoned:
The relationship between the parties, and the duties arising from that relationship, must be con-
sidered in the context of the particular occurrence in dispute .... Although Mrs. Rumley had a
contractual relationship with Allstate, the claim underlying the allegations of bad faith in failing
to promptly settle for policy limits is based not upon benefits payable to her under the policy, but
upon her husband's tort liability to her for his negligence. Mr. Rumley and Mrs. Rumley are
antagonists, not co-claimants.
Rumley v. Allstate Indem. Co., 924 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
" See Chavez v. Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703, 708-10 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (acknowledging a
cognizable claim when the plaintiff and tortfeasor were both insured by State Farm, and the
plaintiff alleges that State Farm delayed making medical payments under her policy "for the
purpose of embarrassing and humiliating the Plaintiff and ... to pressure her into making
settlement of her claim without benefit of outside counsel," but rejecting the claim that State
Farm had a duty to settle her third-party claim in good faith simply because they insured her
as well). Compare Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986) (breach of duty when
claimant's fire insurer did not turn over a fire investigative report that it prepared in the
course of the settlement of the first party claim that would have implicated a neighbor
insured by the same carrier) with Winchell v. Aetna Life, 394 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979) (In response to the claimant's assertion that it was owed duties by Aetna because
the insurance package provided through his employer was with Aetna, the court held that
"[c]ommon sense indicates that such a leap in reasoning is imprudent. It stretches the con-
cept of a fiduciary relationship too far to say that a fiduciary relationship established between
an insurance company and its insured extends to a lawsuit by that insured against another
person insured by the same insurance company") and Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("In the case before us, Pixton has no
relevant contractual relationship with State Farm.") (emphasis added).
38 For example, in cases in which the insured is likely to be wholly judgment proof and
perhaps difficult to find, an insurer might act in bad faith to coerce a lower settlement know-
ing that its insured is unlikely ever to assert a claim or to assign a claim to the plaintiff.
Consequently, I would endorse the reasoning in Judge Del Sole's dissenting opinion, as
described in note 23 supra. Additionally, even if the tortfeasor can be located and has some
assets at risk, the assumption that the claimant would pursue these personal assets in order to
induce the reluctant insured to assign its rights to the claimant may be mistaken. Cf. Tom
Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 275 (2001).
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insurer for injuries caused to the claimant by the insurer's bad faith. As to the
question of direct liability, the baseline approach of the common law has been a
firm, unanimous, and continuing refusal to countenance liability. Moreover,
this response is difficult to criticize in the terms in which the question is
presented, even if there are plausible and strong arguments that the doctrinal
constraints should be changed to address this problem.
B. The Royal Globe Approach of Interpreting State Unfair Insurance
Practice Statutes to Create an Implied Cause of Action in Favor of
Injured Third-Party Claimants
In 1979, the California Supreme Court took a bold step in the face of the
common law rule that had been recognized by a unanimous decision of the
court in Murphy just three years earlier. In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, by a four to three vote the court interpreted the state's unfair claims
practices act to provide a private cause of action for third-party claimants who
are injured as a result of an insurer's violation of the act.39 The statute speaks
directly to the problem of bad faith in the claims handling process, and
acknowledges that claimants can be injured by this behavior as well as
insureds. Under 1972 amendments to the California Insurance Code, liability
insurers commit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insur-
ance by
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relat-
ing to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonable clear.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under one
portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other
portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations. 4 0
Royal Globe held that this statutory scheme authorized private civil
actions by third-party claimants when they are injured by conduct that consti-
tutes a violation of the statute.4 The court distinguished Murphy by emphasiz-
ing that it was interpreting a statute rather than changing the established
common law rule.4" However, working within the statutory scheme created
difficulties because the statute was drafted to identify violations that would
39 Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Butte County, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
4 CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 2001).
41 Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 332-34. The court held that third-party claimants could bring a
private cause of action because the statutory scheme clearly was designed to protect them as
well as to protect insureds. Id. at 334-35.
42 Id. at 335.
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give rise to administrative sanctions. The court addressed this problem first by
interpreting the prefatory language requiring a "frequency" of violations suffi-
cient to establish a "general business practice" as being "ambiguous," and then
held that these criteria only applied to actions initiated by the Insurance Com-
missioner, and not to actions for damages by individual insureds or third-party
claimants.43
In dissent, Justice Richardson rejected the "labored attempt" to find a pri-
vate cause of action in a statute clearly designed to identify acts that would be
"subject to administrative regulation and discipline and then only if committed
with the requisite frequency."' Justice Richardson continued with studied
understatement:
If, as the majority asserts, the Legislature had intended to change the course of Cali-
fornia [common] law 180 degrees and thereafter to impose upon carriers civil liabil-
ity to injured third persons for failing to settle claims against their insured, then
surely much more direct and precise language would have been selected.45
In short, Royal Globe represented a sharply divided decision of the
Supreme Court to imply within a regulatory statutory scheme a private cause of
action that was firmly rejected under prior common law decisions.
Royal Globe engendered a legacy of confusion and complexity.4 6 For
example, Royal Globe required third-party claimants to press their claims
41 Id. at 336. Other courts found this leap to be too far from the plain intent of the statutory
language. See, e.g., Dvorak v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 332-33 (N.D.
1993) (holding that, if a private right of action does exist, it would require the claimant to
prove that the insurer is involved in prohibited conduct with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice); O.K. Lumber Co., Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d
523, 527 (Alaska 1988) ("The statute prohibits acts committed so frequently as to become a
trade practice; it does not readily lend itself to enforcement by a private cause of action
arising from a single claim.").
4 Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 338-39 (Richardson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
45 Id. at 340.
46 In the Moradi-Shalal opinion overturning Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court
reported that commentary
on Royal Globe has been generally critical of that decision. (See, e.g., Note, Rodriguez v. Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Companies, Inc.: An Illustration of the Problems Inherent in the Royal
Globe Doctrine (1985) 15 Sw. U. L. REV. 371; Note, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards
in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court (1983) 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 917; Allen,
Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention (1982) 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 843;
Comment, Liability Insurers and Third-Party Claimants: The Limits of Duty (1981) 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 125, 148-51; Comment, Liability to Third Parties for Economic Injury: Priviy as a
Useful Animal, or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 87, 111-18, 125-27 (1981);
Price, Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit Against an
Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1176-87 (1980); Note, Extending the
Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 7
PEPPERDINE L.REv. 777, 791-93 (1980)).
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58, 64 (Cal. 1988). See also Elaine W.
Reagan, Note, Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund: A Counter-Revolution in Insurance Bad
Faith, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 847, 856-57 (1991) (noting that Royal Globe would promote
multiple litigation, increase insurance costs, and create a conflict of interest between the
insurer and the insured; in addition, Royal Globe created analytical difficulties such as what
is "bad faith," when does the duty to settle arise, and when is the underlying action
concluded).
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against the insured to conclusion before their cause of action against the carrier
for unfair settlement practices would ripen.47 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
resolved a split among the districts of the appellate court and determined that a
third-party claimant must obtain a verdict against the insured to pursue a Royal
Globe claim, holding that a settlement of the underlying action precludes a
necessary prerequisite of a suit against the carrier.4 8 This doctrinal rule had
perverse consequences, as exemplified in Williams v. Transport Indemnity
C0.4 9 In Williams, after the insured rear-ended the plaintiff, the carrier paid for
property damage but allegedly refused to pay for the personal injuries because
it knew that the claimant was dying of cancer and heart disease. The appellate
court held that the failure of the claimant to bring suit prior to his death, even
under these extreme circumstances, constituted a failure to satisfy a prerequisite
of Royal Globe liability.5" As decisions like these cumulated, many parties
began to question the desirability and effectiveness of the Royal Globe attempt
to imply a private cause of action under a regulatory statute that seemed ill-
suited to damages actions by third-party claimants.
C. The Demise of the Royal Globe Cause of Action: The California
Supreme Court Retracts Its Questionable Statutory Interpretation
Faced with an increasing number of complex issues and a rising chorus of
criticism, in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., the California
Supreme Court reversed Royal Globe and ruled prospectively that third-party
claimants could no longer bring suit for violations of the unfair claims practices
statute. 51 The court based its decision on the unpersuasive statutory interpreta-
tion supporting Royal Globe and the "undesirable social and economic
effects" of the decision, including an increase in litigation and the cost of insur-
ance. 53 By rejecting the strained statutory interpretation in Royal Globe, the
Moradi-Shalal court referred the complex set of issues surrounding the rights
of third-party claimants to the legislature for its express consideration.
It seems evident that resolution of these issues regarding the application of Royal
Globe involves a difficult weighing of competing policies. Such a determination is
more properly made by the Legislature. Yet the interpretive difficulties and complex
4' Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 892.
48 Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58, 69 (Cal. 1988) (reversing Royal
Globe prospectively, but determining for pending cases that settlement of the underlying
action is insufficient to trigger liability).
49 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1984).
50 Id. at 873.
51 Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 58. Insureds also lost their right to maintain a private civil
action for violation of the unfair claims practices statute. See Zephyr Park, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 262 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Ct. App. 1989).
52 The court noted that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners subsequently
had issued a report stating that the Model Unfair Claims Practices Act, on which California
had modeled its statute, specifically excluded a private cause of action during the drafting
process. Additionally, the court cited to additional legislative history confirming that the
statute contemplated only administrative enforcement, and also noted substantial (but, ulti-
mately, unsuccessful) efforts in the legislature to abrogate the Royal Globe holding. Id.
51 Id. at 65. The court admitted that these undesirable effects were alleged by critics in the
secondary literature, and were not proven by the parties in the litigation or supported by any
empirical data before the court.
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public policy choices arising under Royal Globe result solely from its conclusion that
the Legislature intended to confer a private right of action for violation of section
790.03. Reconsideration of that decision seems a far better alternative than allowing
ourselves to be swept deeper into the developing interpretive whirlpool it has
created.54
On its face, then, the court did not discount the importance of recognizing
the rights of third-party claimants. Instead, the court determined that it should
await an express and detailed determination of these rights by the legislature
rather than using questionable techniques of statutory interpretation to imply
such rights as part of a regulatory scheme.
The court concluded by emphasizing that it did not intend to give insur-
ance carriers free reign to treat third-party claimants unfairly. It encouraged the
Insurance Commissioner to police unfair practices with administrative sanc-
tions under the statute, and it emphasized that the Legislature always could
create an express private right of action to replace the Royal Globe action. 55
But the court went even further, adding:
Moreover, apart from administrative remedies, the courts retain jurisdiction to
impose civil damages or other remedies against insurers in appropriate common law
actions, based on such traditional theories as fraud, infliction of emotional distress,
and (as to the insured) either breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Punitive damages may be available in actions not arising
from contract, where fraud, oppression or malice is proved. In addition, prejudgment
interest may be awarded where an insurer has attempted to avoid a prompt, fair
settlement.
56
After eschewing the difficulties of elaborating the Royal Globe cause of
action in the absence of more specific statutory authority, the court appeared to
invite application of traditional common law principles to prevent unfair settle-
ment practices that injure third-party claimants.
Such a concession was insufficient for Justice Mosk, the author of the
Royal Globe opinion, who dissented vigorously. Caustically concluding that
the court had "replaced Royal Globe with a 'Royal Bonanza' for insurance
carriers, i.e. total immunity for unfair and deceptive practices committed on
innocent claimants," and had "exalted principal over principle," Justice Mosk
argued that administrative sanctions alone would be insufficient to protect
third-party claimants from bad faith practices.57 Although his arguments in
favor of holding insurers accountable to third-party claimants hold some
appeal, Justice Mosk was unable to demonstrate that implying a cause of action
under a regulatory statute was a prudent or effective means accomplishing this
goal. In the end, the Royal Globe court's strained interpretation of the statutory
scheme was probably unwarranted and ill-advised. Justice Mosk was unwilling
to accept this fact, although he still could have insisted that this conclusion goes
more to the means chosen by the Royal Globe court rather than the goal of
holding insurers accountable for damages when they deal with third-party
54 Id. at 68.
55 Id. at 69.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 75 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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claimants in bad faith. Ironically, it was the majority opinion that pointed
(even if only vaguely) in this direction.
III. AFTER MORADI-SHALAL: IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF LIABILITY FOR
BAD FAITH SETTLEMENT PRACTICES BY INSURERS
A. Legislative Developments Following Moradi-Shalal
Moradi-Shalal reversed the decision that the unfair claim practices act
included an implied right of action for third-party claimants, but the court
acknowledged the legislature's obvious power to create a private right of action
expressly. Theoretically, the easiest method for overcoming the decision in
Moradi-Shalal would be legislation establishing a private right of action, but
the legislative process is a complex minefield not easily traversed. In his dis-
senting opinion in Moradi-Shalal, Justice Mosk noted that the well-funded
insurance lobby had not been successful in its persistent efforts to secure legis-
lation reversing Royal Globe during the nine years following the decision.5"
After Moradi-Shalal, the shoe was on the other foot.
Despite the odds, in 1999 the California legislature enacted the Fair Insur-
ance Responsibility Act of 2000 (FAIR).5 9 The Act was signed into law by
Governor Davis on October 10, 1999, to become effective on January 1, 2000.
FAIR survived the legislative process only because it was a compromise bill
crafted with the assent of several large insurance carriers. 60 FAIR did not fully
restore Royal Globe, but it did provide for direct actions by third-party claim-
ants in certain circumstances. The supporters of FAIR contended that the his-
tory following Moradi-Shalal demonstrated a pressing need to resuscitate the
Royal Globe action in some form. The Consumer Attorneys of California
(CAOC) pointed to the huge increase in profits and large drop in loss costs for
auto insurers and general liability insurers following Moradi-Shalal, and
insisted:
[I]nsurers have used their immunity under Moradi-Shalal to habitually delay settle-
ment even when liability is clear, waiting until the day of trial in some cases, so that
they may earn interest on the reserves maintained to settle claims and in turn force
the claimant to accept a lower award if they needed an earlier settlement. CAOC
asserts that the delay can be as long as three or four years, which forces many con-
sumers to accept inadequate settlements when they cannot wait because of advanced
age or serious injuries in need of medical attention. CAOC asserts that in some
cases, the delay is so long that the consumer dies before any settlement, thereby
letting the insurer off the hook for personal injury damages.6 1
In support of these claims, the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
submitted a study demonstrating that the "average payout of a bodily injury
58 Id. at 68 (commenting that Royal Globe "has survived Herculean efforts of the insurance
industry to legislatively overrule it").
59 1999 Cal. Stat. 720 et. seq. (S.B. 1237).
6o "The final compromise legislation was supported by the Consumer Attorneys of Califor-
nia, Mercury Insurance Group, and several commercial lines insurers including AIG, Trav-
elers, and the American Insurance Association." Henry B. LaTorraca, Collision Course, 23
L.A. LAW. 50, 52 (Mar. 2000).
61 Senate Bill Analysis, S.B. 1237, Senate Judiciary Committee (May 26, 1999).
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claim in California in 1998 was $6,996 compared to the national average pay-
out of $9,540."
FAIR did not survive long. The remaining industry opponents of the law
gathered enough signatures to submit the new statute to the voters by referen-
dum.62 Subsequently, FAIR was rejected by a margin slightly exceeding two
to one. 63 As might be expected, the sophisticated insurance lobby ran a well-
financed campaign to defeat the Act, leading some newspaper editorial pages to
charge that the insurers were engaging in deceptive tactics to avoid being held
accountable for bad faith practices.64 Discerning a lesson in this tangled politi-
cal storyline is difficult, to say the least. Although the legislature reacted favor-
ably to the arguments by FAIR's proponents, it remains doubtful that there will
be additional legislative action in light of the unsuccessful voter referendum.6 5
62 See CAL. CONST. art. 2, §9(b).
63 California Rejects Bad Faith Laws, 11 INS. ACCT. 11 (Mar. 13, 2000).
64 SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 6, 2000, at AI7 ("Out of state insurance companies are
spending $50 million trying to defeat [FAIR]. Their front organizations say a "no" would
save Californians from higher auto premiums. That is misleading drivel."); THE PRESS DEM-
OCRAT, Mar. 5, 2000, at GI ("The worst example [of "hyperbole-if not bare-faced lying"]
this [election] has been the campaign ads in opposition to [FAIR].... [Insurers have] raised
more than $50 million to make sure they win. All of this to defeat a state law designed to
hold them accountable for following fair business practices"); THE PRESS DEMOCRAT, Feb.
20, 2000, at G2 (decrying the fact that some insurers refused to work on the compromise bill
and now "have dug in their heels and are trying to overturn these laws" with "deceptive
advertising" and other "specious" tactics); L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at B6 (arguing that
insurers like State Farm, Allstate, and Fireman's Fund have conducted a "multimillion-dollar
advertising blitz" in which "shreds of truth" are "hidden by the TV ads' brazen distortions");
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at A3 (reporting that State Farm contributed $16.7 million, and
Farmers Insurance $15.8 million toward a $44 million war chest already accumulated
months before the election to defeat FAIR).
65 In three states, the legislature responded to the judiciary's reluctance to imply a cause of
action by expressly amending the insurance code to provide a private right of action in favor
of third-party claimants. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242 (2001) (providing that
insureds and third-party claimants may recover actual damages for a violation of certain
provisions of the unfair claims practices act without having to prove that the violations were
so frequent as to indicate a general business practice; but precluding common law actions
alleging bad faith); N.M. STAT ANN. § 59A-16-30 (Michie 2001) (permitting any person
injured by a violation to bring an action for actual damages, in addition to any available
common law remedies); LA. REv. STAT ANN § 22:1220 (West 2001) (providing a cause of
action for certain defined bad faith actions in settling third-party claims). My argument that
courts should provide tort remedies to third-parties claimants in certain circumstances obvi-
ously is superfluous as to jurisdictions that have expressly granted these rights to third-party
claimants.
However, some state legislatures have amended their codes to provide an express cause
of action only for insureds. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.310(2) (2001) (establishing
cause of action for insureds); Gunny v. Allstate Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Nev. 1992)
(holding that the statutory cause of action is limited to insureds and is not available to third-
party claimants). Consequently, the question of the rights of third-party claimants remains
unanswered in the statute and is left to common law development.
A number of states have amended their insurance codes in a variety of ways to provide
that there is no express private cause of action under the unfair claims practices act, leaving
open the question of the extent to which injured parties can recover under common law
theories. Some states parallel the holding of Moradi-Shalal by stating that the unfair claims
practices act has no effect on whatever rights a claimant might otherwise have under com-
mon law. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-301(b)(2) (2001) ("This subtitle does not provide
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The Moradi-Shalal court eliminated the Royal Globe cause of action for
damages, but it appeared to leave open the question whether courts could use
violations of the insurance statutes as the basis for other remedies. This ambi-
guity led the appellate court to conclude that an insured person could use a
violation of the state insurance statutes as the basis of a defensive estoppel. In
Spray, Gould & Bowers v. Ass'n International Insurance Co. ,66 the court held
that an insurer's direct violation of an administrative regulation requiring notice
of time limits pertaining to a claim provides the basis for an estoppel. when the
insurer later asserts a contract limitation defense. The court distinguished
or prohibit a private cause of action to, or on behalf of, a claimant or other person in any
state."). This clearly leaves courts free to develop common law remedies for aggrieved
parties.
Many states have amended their statutes to state clearly that there is no private right of
action under the unfair claims practices act. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125(b) (Michie
2001) ("The provisions of this section do not create or imply a private cause of action for a
violation of this section."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-461(D) (2001) ("Nothing contained in this
section is intended to provide any private right or cause of action to or on behalf of any
insured or uninsured resident or nonresident of this state. It is, however, the specific intent
of this section to provide solely an administrative remedy to the director for any violation of
this section or rule related thereto."); GA CODE ANN. § 33-6-37 (2001) ("Nothing contained
in this article shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of
this article."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2164-D(8) (West 2001) ("This section may
not be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of this section.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8) (2001) ("a private right of action shall not be maintained
under this subdivision ...."). Other states make it clear that actions under the statute may
be initiated only by the insurance commissioner. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:13-107
(2001) ("All remedies, penalties and proceedings set forth in this article are to be invoked
solely and exclusively by the commissioner."). Some states provide only that injured parties
may file complaints with the commissioner. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 27-4-1-5.6(a) (2001) ("A
person who believes the person has been adversely affected by an unfair claim settlement
practice" may make written application to the superintendent for a hearing to determine if
there has been a violation).
These provisions plainly are limited to removing any doubt about the intent of the
legislature to create a private cause of action under unfair claims practices acts, but they do
not purport to divest the courts of their common law power to recognize new causes of
action in this area. To my knowledge, no state legislature has amended its insurance code to
specifically insulate liability insurance carriers from common law theories of recovery.
Finally, some state legislatures have considered adding an express private cause of
action to their unfair claims practices act, but have declined to do so, leading courts to
interpret this as a legislative decision to preclude private rights of action. See, e.g., Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. 1994). In Watson, the court noted that in
1991, "the legislature deleted a provision from H.B.2 that would have provided a private
cause of action ... to any 'claimant' for unfair claim settlement practices," and concluded:
[W]e cannot ignore the legislature's refusal to create a statutory private cause of action for unfair
claim settlement practices for third party claimants [and therefore] we will not construe [the
statutory cause of action for unfair competition and unfair business practices] to permit, indi-
rectly, a third party claimant to sue an insurer for unfair claim settlement practices ... where she
may not do so directly and where the legislature has specifically refused to create such a cause of
action.
Id. Although legislative inaction typically is unreliable guidance for interpreting a previ-
ously enacted statute, it seems plausible that, when faced with similar circumstances, courts
may choose not to ground liability in the state unfair claim settlement practices act.
66 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552 (Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 1999 Cal. LEXIS 5359 (Aug. 11,
1999).
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Moradi-Shalal and concluded that estoppel is precisely the kind of non-dam-
ages remedy that Moradi-Shalal contemplated.67 The Spray court acknowl-
edged that its decision might change the practices of some insurers, but
concluded that
those insurers have no legitimate grounds for complaint. We create no new liability
for insurers .... The commissioner's regulations establish the standard of conduct
for insurers in California. Insurers who flout the regulations have no right to gain a
competitive edge on insurers who scrupulously follow the regulations and faithfully
discharge their obligations to their insureds.
6 8
Although distinguishable from implying a private cause of action under
the unfair claims practices act, this analysis comes close to repeating the basis
for the Royal Globe decision. If an insurer violates a statutory duty, and if that
violation injures a third-party claimant who will not otherwise be compensated
for the injury, it makes perfect sense to permit the injured party to seek redress
on the basis of this breach of a statutory duty. Of course, the estoppel remedy
only benefits insureds; third-party claimants who suffer injury as a result of
violations of the insurance code do not gain anything from an estoppel remedy.
In a related vein, a federal district court in California held that an insured
can-bring a private action under California's Unfair Competition Act for fraud-
ulent behavior by an insurance company in adjusting a property claim despite
the rejection of an implied cause of action under the unfair claims practices
statutes. The court reasoned:
In sum, the Court finds that notwithstanding Moradi-Shalal, allegations of fraudulent
and unfair business activity are sufficient to state a cause of action for relief under the
UCA. Because such causes of action are independently actionable from [the unfair
claims settlement practices act section] 790.03, the Court finds that Moradi-Shalal
does not preclude them from stating a claim under the UCA.
6 9
A Texas Court of Appeals similarly found that the case law rejecting a
third-party private cause of action under the unfair claims settlement practices
statute does not mean "that all statutory causes of actions by third-parties are
• * * barred, albeit they are significantly narrowed."'70 The court found the
insurer liable to the third-party claimant under the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act when it directed the claimant to bring the damaged vehicle to a certain shop
and agreed to pay for the repairs, but then refused to make payment.7 1 Finally,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that violations of the state's
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices statute were sufficient to trigger liability
under the state's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and that third-party claimants
have standing to sue insurers under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.72 How-
ever, the legislative history of the Massachusetts Deceptive Trade Practices Act
is somewhat unique, suggesting that other jurisdictions may not follow this
indirect approach to grounding insurer liability to third-party claimants in statu-
67 Id. at 539.
68 Id. at 560-61. This reasoning was endorsed in Neufeld v. Balboa Insurance Co., 101 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 151, 154-55 (Ct. App. 2000).
69 Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Group, 185 F.R.D. 581, 595 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
70 Webb v. Int'l Trucking Co., Inc., 909 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. App. 1995).
71 Id.
72 See Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Mass. 1983).
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tory language.73 In short, an independent violation of a statutory scheme that
includes a private remedy might still provide some relief to third-party claim-
ants against liability insurers.
B. The Unsuccessful Return to Common Law Theories of Liability After
Moradi-Shalal
The California courts also have struggled with the suggestion in Moradi-
Shalal that it might be appropriate in some circumstances for claimants to
recover damages from insurers using traditional common law theories such as
"infliction of emotional distress."74 As pending Royal Globe cases wind down
and the Moradi-Shalal decision begins to control new filings, third-party claim-
ants have begun to seek damages for bad faith settlement practices under the
relatively new tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, or under the
more well-established but demanding tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Initially, courts were reluctant to resuscitate a Royal Globe cause of
action by permitting parties to re-package their cause of action as a tort. In
effect, the courts moved toward the conclusion that facts giving rise to liability
under the Royal Globe doctrine are necessary but not sufficient to trigger liabil-
ity for emotional distress claims. Thus, in response to suits by third-party
claimants under tort theories of emotional distress when they could not meet
the Royal Globe requirements for recovery, courts held that the duty of the
insurance carrier arose from the unfair claim practices act, and so failure to
meet the requirements of Royal Globe was deemed fatal to the emotional dis-
tress suit. 75 On the other hand, mere violation of the unfair claims practices act
was held to be insufficient to satisfy the conduct requirement of emotional dis-
tress claims, particularly the "outrageous" standard for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
76
73 The court explained that it originally held that a single violation of the Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act gave rise to a cause of action by an insured under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. Id. at 360 (discussing Dood v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 365 N.E.2d
802 (Mass. 1977)). Subsequently, the Massachusetts legislature amended the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act to make clear that "any person" could maintain a private action, leading
the court to conclude that third-party claimants are entitled to relief under the statute. Id.
The court noted that one advantage to using the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is that the
requirement of a pattern of violations under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act
would not apply to the private plaintiff. "We shall proceed on the assumption that a single
act in the handling of a claim constitutes a violation of [the Deceptive Trade Practices Act] if
it is an act that as part of a pattern of conduct would be a violation of [the Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act]." Id. at 361.
71 Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988).
11 Williams v. Transp. Indem. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873 (Ct. App. 1984) (failure to
satisfy the Royal Globe prerequisites is fatal to claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress); Lee v. Travelers Cos., 252 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1988) (same).
76 Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664-65 (Ct. App. 1983)
(violation of statute is insufficient to meet the requirement of outrageous conduct for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress despite more than a two year delay in paying the
claim); Soto v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 229 Cal. Rptr. 192, 198-200 (Ct. App. 1986) ("mere
delay in payment of a worker's compensation award to an employee head of the household is
not even remotely similar to the kind of abnormal event which will foreseeably trigger the
high degree of trauma and distress" required for negligent infliction of emotional distress;
similarly rejecting claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lee v. Travelers
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Despite initial resistance, third-party claimants continued to argue force-
fully that tort duties are independent of statutory duties, and that insurers
should be held liable for their tortious behavior irrespective of whether the
claimant has the right to bring a statutory action. With respect to intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims, this argument has been accepted,
although the claimant still bears the burden of proving that the insurer's behav-
ior meets the required level of "outrageous" conduct. In Doctor's Co. Insur-
ance Services v. Superior Court, 7 a third-party claimant amended his Royal
Globe complaint after Moradi-Shalal definitively established that his settle-
ment for the policy limits prior to trial was fatal to pursuing his claim. The
claimant, a victim of medical malpractice, re-pleaded her case to allege that the
insurer intentionally inflicted emotional distress by hiding the insured doctor's
admitted liability for three years in an effort to browbeat her into settling, going
so far as to suborn perjured deposition testimony by the insured and another
doctor. The court of appeals concluded that these facts trumped the court's
traditional hesitancy to permit third-party claimants to pursue emotional dis-
tress claims against insurers:
Lee v. Travelers Companies held a plaintiff cannot avoid Moradi-Shalal by relabel-
ing the theory, where the material allegations assert nothing more than an insurer's
violation of its statutory duties.
Nevertheless, as suggested in Lee, an action may lie if based on outrageous
conduct beyond mere violation of the insurer's duties. Thus, for example, a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may lie where an
insurer sends harassing or deceptive letters in an effort to induce a third party
claimant to settle.
It thus appears the facts pleaded in the ... complaint avoid the Moradi-
Shalal bar, because advising an insured to lie in a deposition may constitute
intentional outrageous conduct going beyond mere violation of the insured's
duties under the Insurance code and causing foreseeable injury to plaintiffs.7 8
This analysis is certainly correct, but the strict pleading and proof require-
ments for intentional infliction of emotional distress suggest that this avenue of
recovery will be reserved only for the most egregious cases.
The recently expanded tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
provides more opportunities for third-party claimants to recover for bad faith
settlement practices, but the courts have not moved to embrace this theory of
recovery under the Moradi-Shalal exception. It should not be surprising that
courts are hesitant to apply the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
to this context. First, the recent expansion of negligent infliction of emotional
Cos., 252 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1988) (failure to allege with specificity acts beyond
violation of the statute that are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of what usually is toler-
ated in a civilized community precludes claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
77 275 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676 (Ct. App. 1990).
78 Id. at 678 (citations omitted). However, the court ultimately concluded that the absolute
statutory litigation privilege protected the carrier from liability, even though it had subomed
perjury, because its role in the litigation effectively made it a participant for purposes of the
statutory protection. Id. at 683-84.
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distress claims to cases not involving physical injury7 9 has opened a potentially
huge Pandora's box; consequently, courts have cautiously applied the tort in
new settings. 80 Moreover, the history of the Royal Globe cause of action
undoubtedly has made courts especially skeptical about permitting plaintiffs to
use a flexible tort concept to reinstate Royal Globe in different guise. In the
wake of Moradi-Shalal, negligent infliction of emotional distress appeared to
be the sole remaining avenue to address the problem of insurer bad faith toward
third-party claimants in a significant and far-reaching manner. This anticipated
development has failed to materialize thus far.
In 1994, the court of appeals erected a substantial roadblock to negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims in Krupnick v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.8' This case not only signaled that the "emotional distress"
exception of Moradi-Shalal would not become a broad-based tool for policing
bad faith, it made clear that this would not even be a viable tort theory for third-
party claimants. Krupnick is a watershed case because it considered the public
policy question of imposing liability on insurers against the baseline common
law rule and the history of the Royal Globe cause of action. For third-party
claimants, negligent infliction of emotional distress appeared to be the last
plausible theory for supporting a claim for damages against insurers. Krupnick
sought to put an end to such hopes, although it was a split decision and con-
tained a lengthy dissent.8 2
79 See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (extending the ruling in
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) to permit recovery of damages for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional or mental distress that is unaccompanied by physical injury).
80 Consider the dynamic context of employment law. Many employees have begun to file
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress as the theories for recovering for wrong-
ful termination have run out of steam. Where such claims are not precluded by the exclusiv-
ity of the Worker's Compensation statutes, courts have been extremely cautious about
permitting claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress to undermine the traditional
"at will" rule. See Parsons v. United Techs. Corp., 700 A.2d 655, 667 (Conn. 1997) ("The
mere termination of employment, even where it is wrongful, is therefore not, by itself,
enough to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress."). See also Hanley v.
Riverside Methodist Hosps., 603 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting appli-
cation of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to the employment context and
continuing the traditional adherence to the "bystander rule").
81 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Ct. App. 1994).
82 At least one court has remained open to the idea that the common law could provide a
remedy for insurer bad faith. Recently, a Connecticut trial court refused to recognize a
general tort duty owed by insurance carriers to third-party claimants, but went on to state:
"All of this, of course, would not bar in the appropriate case other tort theories of recovery
such as fraud or the negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress if the insurer's
dealings with a third-party claimant warranted these other common law allegations." Chap-
pell v. LaRosa, 2001 WL 58057, at *4 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2001). After then
rehearsing the Moradi-Shalal rationale for not implying a private cause of action under the
unfair claims practices statute, and quoting that court's reference to the potential liability
under fraud and emotional distress theories, the court acknowledged the potential for flexible
tort concepts to police insurer bad faith.
This court agrees with [the observations in Moradi-Shalal that there may be common law
grounds for liability - to put another perspective on the issue, if the factual allegations made here
do not support an action in fraud or negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, why
should the passage and existence of [a regulatory statute] create a remedy for the same underly-
ing conduct. But beyond that, this does not mean the law must remain frozen; the common law,
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In Krupnick, the third-party claimants had been rear-ended by the insured,
settled the case for $295,000 prior to trial, and then brought a Royal Globe
action "for their purely emotional distress. 83 The claimants revised their com-
plaint to allege negligent infliction of emotional distress after the Moradi-
Shalal decision precluded Royal Globe actions when the underlying action had
been settled, but the trial court entered summary judgment for the insurer.84
Justice McDaniel, writing for the court, characterized the claimants' theory as
nothing more than an attempt to use tort principles to revive Royal Globe.85 In
response to the claimants' argument that Moradi-Shalal had specifically invited
courts to retain their jurisdiction to prevent insurer overreaching by using tradi-
tional common law theories of liability such as infliction of emotional distress,
the court emphatically rejected the idea that Moradi-Shalal recognized any
duties owed by insurance carriers to third-party claimants. The court held that
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress "is not sanctioned by par-
ticular language contained in Moradi-Shalal. . . . In our view, upon closer
scrutiny, this 'reassuring language' does not constitute a substantive holding; it
only assures us, beyond the overruling of Royal Globe, that nothing has
changed."86 Of course, prior to the Royal Globe opinion, the baseline common
law rule was that insurers owed no duties to third-party claimants.
The Krupnick court then analyzed why third-party claimants could not
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against insurance
carriers who handle their claims in bad faith. First, the court reasoned that
numerous actions can foreseeably result in some other person experiencing
some emotional distress, and therefore that tort liability must be grounded on a
pre-existing duty of some kind, rather than simply on foreseeability analysis.87
The court extensively discussed the modem case law regarding negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress and held that the cases established (implicitly, if not
explicitly) that the tort would cast an overly broad net of liability if it was not
flexible as it is, can always consider accommodating new types of factual allegations under such
traditional torts.
id. at *9. It is precisely this openness to flexible adaptation that the Krupnick court rejected.
Whether any appellate court will begin to develop common law theories in this manner
remains to be seen, but the prospects do not appear favorable.
83 Krupnick, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 39-40.
84 Id. at 40. The claimants also sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
pursuant to a general statutory provision establishing liability for negligence, but the court
determined that these claims could "be readily disposed of under established precedents" and
did not include analysis of these claims in its published opinion. Id.
85 In reality, this case, insofar as it involves a claim based on negligent infliction of
emotional distress, amounts to a thinly disguised effort to persuade us, despite the
overruling of Royal Globe, to include within the theories of common-law liability for
negligence, a cause of action based upon precisely the same facts as were actionable
under the Insurance Code pursuant to Royal Globe, before that case was overruled.
To countenance a common-law action by third parties directly against insurance companies
would restore the precise evils [of Royal Globe].
Id. at 40, 45 (emphasis in original).
86 Id. at 41.
87 d. at 46-49.
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confined to situations where the tortfeasor already owed duties to the
plaintiff."8
The court then noted that no California court had ever imposed a duty on
insurance carriers to negotiate in good faith for the benefit of third-party claim-
ants; consequently, the court placed the burden on the claimants to demonstrate
the existence of a duty that could ground their claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.8 9 This led the court to the substantive point in question:
whether the claimants had met their burden of demonstrating that public policy
supported imposing a duty on liability insurance carriers regarding their deal-
ings with third-party claimants. At this juncture, the court simply restated the
baseline common law rule that the insurance carrier is contractually obligated
only to the insured until such time as the insured suffers a verdict, and therefore
insurance carriers are free to make settlement determinations in their own eco-
nomic interest and without any duty to the claimants. Thus, the court
concluded,
Plaintiffs' view of this case is wholly out of touch with the economic goals which
give rise to contracts of insurance in the first place. Insurance companies exist to
provide a critical financial indemnity for the risks of their insureds, not to salve the
feelings of displeased third-party claimants. As an actuarial matter, there is no way
to factor in the emotional distress of third-party claimants in trying to compute the
premiums to be charged for the risks faced by the insured policy holders.
9 0
Because liability insurers are free to refuse to settle claims for their own
business interests and without regard for the interests of third-party claimants,
the court concluded that there was no basis for finding a pre-existing duty
between these parties that would support a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress by third-party claimants. The following year, Justice
McDaniel made clear that the import of Krupnick was to "reject out of hand"
the claim that insurers owe any duty to third-party claimants: "The Krupnick
decision is a complete answer to the argument of plaintiff's counsel that there
was a direct duty owed plaintiff by defendant to investigate the claim and to
offer policy limits once all the facts were disclosed. There is no such duty."9
Justice Timlin dissented in the strongest terms, arguing that the court had
misinterpreted both the claimant's theory of recovery and the applicable law.
As to the legal requirements for stating a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, he rejected the requirement that tort liability be predicated on
the breach of a duty that existed prior to the conduct in question.92 Moreover,
because Moradi-Shalal clearly contemplated that courts would apply traditional
88 Id. at 49-53. The court was operating in a doctrinal area described by one commentator
at that time as "a Gordian knot" due to the Supreme Court's lack of guidance, with the result
that "mass confusion" was reigning among the lower courts. Colleen Wilcox Heidenreich,
Comment, Clarifying California's Approach to Claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 277 (1995). Justice McDaniel, the author of the opinion in
Krupnick, was building on an earlier opinion in which he had concluded that liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress had to be based on something more than foresee-
ability. See Bro v. Glaser, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Ct. App. 1994).
89 Krupnick, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49-50.
90 Id. at 50-51.
91 Messersmith v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 879 (Ct. App. 1995).
92 Krupnick, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63-64 (Timlin, J., dissenting).
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tort principles to this relationship, Justice Timlin also argued that the majority
erred by assuming that Moradi-Shalal had simply reaffirmed the baseline com-
mon law rule.93 He concluded that the claimants "are simply asking that this
court apply the same principles of tort liability to automobile liability insurance
companies in their relationship with claimants as are applied to other
tortfeasors."9 4 The burden of proof, then, should be on insurers to demonstrate
why they should be excepted from general tort law.95
The majority also misconstrued the nature of the claimants' theory of
recovery, according to Justice Timlin. The gravamen of the action was "affirm-
ative misconduct" by the insurance company, including hiding the clear liabil-
ity of its insured and stonewalling settlement negotiations for three years.
9 6
The claimants do not assume that there is a duty owed by the carrier to settle
any claim made against an insured, he emphasized, as that admittedly "would
be a ridiculous position."97 Instead, their claim rests on the true nature of the
relationship between the parties that is obscured by the baseline common law
rule:
Upon the involvement of an insured in an accident with a person who incurs injuries
and/or property damage, resulting in that person making a claim against the insurer, a
special relationship begins to exist between the claimant and the insurer at the time
the claim is made creating a duty by the insurer and claimant to attempt to resolve the
claim without unreasonable delay, in fairness and in good faith. This special rela-
tionship is not adversarial in nature but is one of openness, candor and understanding.
It only becomes adversarial when one or both parties act unreasonably and unfairly
toward the other during the attempt to settle, e.g., when there has been unreasonable
delay or arbitrary refusal by the insurer to resolve the claim, particularly when the
insured's liability for the accident and the claimant's injuries and losses are reasona-
bly certain.
9 8
Based on this description of the relationship of the parties, the obligation at
issue is a straightforward "duty to deal honestly and in good faith during settle-
ment negotiations with third-party claimants, and to attempt to come to a fair
settlement within a reasonable amount of time after the insured's liability has
become reasonably clear and the claimant's damages are reasonably
ascertainable."99
The baseline common law rule is no longer persuasive, Justice Timlin con-
tended, because the older cases only rejected a duty of good faith grounded in
contract and failed to appreciate that such a duty should be imposed for reasons
of public policy. His argument begins by appealing to the self-evident nature
of his conclusion.
93 Id. at 61-63.
94 id. at 63.
95 Id. at 80. Justice Timlin argued that CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (Deering 2001), setting out
the fundamental principle that all persons are responsible for injuries caused by negligent
conduct, establishes a public policy in favor of holding parties responsible for injuries caused
by their negligent acts unless they can point to a stronger public policy to the contrary. Id. at
72-74.
96 Id. at 56-57.
97 Id. at 63 n.9.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 65.
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It is rather obvious that by entering into policies of automobile collision liability
insurance, insurers are voluntarily assuming a duty to the insured to exercise due care
in handling claims by such insured under such policies, just as it is obvious that they
are also entering into a potential relationship with yet-to-be-identified claimants who
may be injured by their insureds, which potential relationship can and will ripen into
a legally significant relationship once the insurer is notified that its insured has
injured a particular claimant.' 0 0
However, Justice Timlin later listed a number of public policy reasons why
insurers should not be insulated from general tort liability.
First, he contended that the emotional and financial injuries suffered by
third-party claimants when insurers act in bad faith toward them are foreseeable
consequences because claimants reasonably expect insurers to investigate and
settle claims fairly.' The "obvious" nature of the relationship between the
parties that engenders these expectations follows from a particular legal and
social context: automobile owners are required to obtain insurance in order to
protect the public; automobile liability insurers are "a government-regulated,
public service entity with ... concomitant duties to the general public as well
as to its insured"; the general public policy to compensate injured parties; and
the specific sanctions against insurer bad faith toward claimants in the unfair
claims practices statute.'o 2 The injuries suffered by claimants if their losses are
not compensated "promptly and in good faith" are foreseeable as well, since it
follows that a person with physical injuries who is forced to endure financial
distress might well suffer emotional distress.
10 3
Additionally, Justice Timlin argued that public policy supports imposing
liability in such cases because there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the
plaintiffs actually suffered harm, and there is a "direct connection between
those injuries and defendants' conduct."'" Moreover, bad faith conduct by an
insurer is morally blameworthy, as evidenced by the unfair claim practices act
and general principles of business ethics.'0 5 Finally, there is a strong public
interest in preventing such behavior by insurers, and imposing liability would
place no undue burdens on insurers beyond inducing appropriate behavior.'0 6
He summarized:
Insurance companies are in the business of insuring against risks, and presumably set
their rates accordingly .... Allowing insurance companies to negligently refuse to
pay, or delay paying, legitimate business obligations which were reasonably foresee-
able after due consideration of the risks involved cannot be condoned (as does the
majority) by characterizing third party actions against such insurers as an unwar-
100 Id.
101 Id. at 82.
102 Id. at 82-83. As to the expectation that the insurer owes duties to claimants, Justice
Timlin later added:
It is clear, under our mandatory financial liability laws, as well as under California's Insurance
Code, that insurers exist and are allowed to do business in California not only to provide their
insureds with financial peace of mind, but to provide persons injured by their insureds with
financial recompense for their injuries in a reasonable and good-faith manner.
Id. at 85.
103 Id. at 83.
104 Id.
1o5 Id. at 84-85.
106 Id. at 85.
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ranted expansion of tort liability, or by denying that such claimants can ever be the
direct victims of insurers' negligent acts.
Just as public policy mandates that parents undertake the support of their own
children, that spouses undertake each other's support, that employers, regard-
less of fault, bear the cost, through worker's compensation insurance, of work-
related injuries to employees, that tortfeasors bear the cost of injuries they have
caused to others by wrongful conduct or nonconduct - so that, at least in part,
such burdens do not fall upon the general public - so too public policy man-
dates that insurance companies undertake the burden of fairly and timely set-
tling those claims as alleged here, when the insured's liability is reasonably
clear and the claimants' damages are reasonably ascertainable and which they
have contracted to cover, for a price, rather than allowing such costs and
expenses encompassed by the claimed damages to fall on the shoulders of the
injured claimants, and, in some cases, on the doctors and hospitals whose bills
will go unpaid, the welfare systems to whom the injured parties may be forced
to turn, and ultimately on the taxpaying public. 107
Justice Timlin argued against narrowing the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and he insisted that the relationship between an insurer and
third-party claimant is sufficient under these tort principles to provide relief to
the claimants.
Despite the force of his argument that public policy supported holding
insurers accountable to third-party claimants for bad faith settlement practices,
Justice Timlin's analysis was constrained by the need to conceptualize the
cause of action in terms of negligent infliction of emotional distress. His public
policy analysis is secondary, in that it is intended only to support the applica-
tion of a specific tort to this relationship. Although the court expressly rejected
his weighing of various public policies in favor of the baseline common law
rule, Justice McDaniel's opinion is more directed toward constraining the scope
of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because negligent
infliction of emotional distress is unlikely to gain ascendency in the courts as a
broad theory of liability, the Krupnick court probably was correct to find that it
is a poor doctrinal vehicle for preventing insurer bad faith. This begs the ques-
tion that has never been analyzed directly: does public policy justify awarding
tort damages to third-party claimants when liability insurers deal with them in
bad faith?
IV. WHAT A LONG STRANGE TRIP IT'S BEEN: OVERCOMING HISTORY AND
BUILDING THE CASE THAT PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFIES HOLDING
INSURANCE CARRIERS LIABLE TO THIRD
PARTY CLAIMANTS
Important considerations of public policy justify holding insurers liable
when they refuse to settle third-party claims in bad faith. However, the doctri-
nal history regarding the potential liability of insurers to third-party claimants
has masked the public interest and confused the issue. In this section, I suggest
a way to place this doctrinal history into context and then to re-conceptualize
107 Id.
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the question of insurer liability in terms of the public interest. I propose a
principled attribution of liability to insurers when their bad faith conduct impli-
cates important public policies, as opposed to implicating only the personal
interests of the claimant.
A recent case from West Virginia, Elmore v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
tive Insurance Co.,"°8 provides a succinct recapitulation of the doctrinal history
in the preceding sections. An insured driver crossed the center line and col-
lided with the claimant's car, killing the claimant's pregnant wife and unborn
child, and injuring the claimant and his three-year old son. 10 9 State Farm
untruthfully told the claimant that he was receiving the maximum settlement
possible because the carrier had to reserve some of the coverage to settle claims
by occupants of the insured's vehicle. State Farm also advised him against
hiring an attorney when he was presented with the release, telling the claimant
that his recovery wouldn't increase and he would then just have to pay one-
third of his recovery to an attorney." 0 In fact, State Farm had an additional
$42,500 of coverage available to settle the claim, which it finally paid years
later when claimant's under-insurance carrier determined that the liability cov-
erage had not been exhausted."' The claimant then sued State Farm, alleging
that it had breached duties owed to the claimant under these circumstances,
since his failure to exhaust the liability limits made recovery under his own
policy impossible.
The court denied recovery under every theory advanced by the claimant,
holding that State Farm was his adversary in litigation and therefore owed no
duty of good faith analogous to the duty it owed to its insured, that State Farm
could not be liable for breach of a fiduciary duty created by its affirmative
statements while settling the case, and that the claimant was not the third-party
intended beneficiary of the insurance contract.' 1 2 At the same time, the court
acknowledged the force of the claimant's arguments in favor of liability.
In advancing his argument [in favor of finding a fiduciary relationship was cre-
ated], the plaintiff places special emphasis on the relative positions of the two parties
during the settlement negotiations, that is, his own emotional vulnerability immedi-
ately following the deaths of his wife and unborn child and a powerful and astute
insurance company bent on furthering its own narrow interests.
In closing, we emphasize that if the plaintiffs allegations against State Farm are
true, State Farm's actions toward the plaintiff are truly reprehensible. This court has
a longstanding policy of encouraging compromise and settlement of disputed claims.
This policy flows, in part, from the recognition that the prompt resolution of an insur-
ance claim is usually of the utmost importance to a claimant as a means of righting a
wrong, treating an injury, or repairing a loss, and hopeful restoring some normalcy
and happiness to his life. Here, for example, the plaintiff faced staggering loss and
yet was forced to grapple with two insurance companies over a period of years just to
receive what was owed him. The equitable and efficient settlement of claims is only
achieved when both parties conduct themselves honorably. This is especially true of
insurance companies because they possess the preponderance of power in the settle-
'08 504 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1998).
109 Id. at 894-95.
"0 Id. at 895.
"ll Id.
112 Id. at 894-901.
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ment process. As noted above, we have set forth the standard of conduct expected of
insurers in their contractual relationships with insureds. Likewise, the Legislature
has prescribed the proper standard for insurance companies toward all claimants,
including third parties, in [the unfair claims practices act].
1 13
Although the claimant was entitled to bring suit under West Virginia's state
unfair claims practices act, in this case the court regretfully agreed that the
claimant's statutory action was time-barred. 4 Despite the court's poignant
description of the reasons for holding the insurer liable for its alleged conduct,
the claimant was left without a remedy. This, of course, is now the reality
facing third-party claimants in the vast majority of states that rejected or
reversed the Royal Globe implied action.
It is time to re-conceptualize the justification for holding insurance carriers
liable to third-party claimants for bad faith settlement practices. The ground
for liability is the public interest in having liability insurance carriers deal with
claims fairly and honestly. From the beginning, the courts have analyzed the
question in terms of the personal rights of the claimants rather than directly
analyzing the question from the perspective of the public interest. The courts
have been correct to reject common law or statutory grounds for liability pre-
mised on duties owed to the claimant, but have failed to consider compensating
the claimant for his injuries to the extent that the insurer's conduct violates
public policy.
The heightened duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by carriers to
their insureds has no application to third-party claimants. This duty protects
against the insurer's abuse of its control over the litigation in a manner that
amounts to gambling with the insured's money by risking a verdict in excess of
policy limits. As the courts repeatedly have stated, the breach of this duty
works to the advantage of the claimant because the insurer must pay the excess
verdict. In the third-party context, bad faith has nothing to do with exposing
the insured to an excess verdict; instead, bad faith is wrongfully delaying pay-
ment to the third party. Courts have been correct not to conflate these two very
different types of bad faith conduct.
Similarly, it is a stretch to construe the claimant as a third-party benefici-
ary of the contract of insurance between the carrier and the insured. The
insured does not purchase the insurance policy to provide a benefit to the
claimant, but rather to protect herself from financial distress in the event that
she becomes liable to a third party. It also is likely that the insured does not
care when the claimant receives compensation, so long as the insured is insu-
lated from the exposure caused by her negligence. Consequently, courts have
been correct to reject the idea that bad faith settlement practices are precluded
by the intent to make the claimant a beneficiary of the insurance contract.
Finally, the labored attempt by courts to "find" an implied right of action
under unfair claims practices statutes unnecessarily skewed the analysis by re-
directing the focus from the grounds for liability to statutory interpretation.
After most states concluded that the legislature did not intend for the statutory
scheme to include a private right of action, courts were wary of efforts by
113 Id. at 898.
114 Id. at 901-02.
Summer 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
claimants to achieve the same result by employing capacious theories of tort
liability, such as negligent infliction of emotional distress. This wariness was
warranted, because it is a mistake to confuse an injury suffered by a claimant
with the ground for liability. Insurers should be held liable not just when they
negligently inflict emotional distress, but also when they engage in bad faith
claim settlement practices in violation of public policy, resulting in injury to the
claimant. Emotional distress may be a common form of injury in these cases,
but the injury is not the gravamen of the action. It is conceivable that an
insurer could act contrary to public policy and thereby cause financial harm to a
claimant for which it should be held liable, even if the claimant does not suffer
any emotional distress.
After adjusting the focus from trying to bend traditional causes of action to
considering the public policy in issue directly, the question becomes much eas-
ier to address." 15 There can be no argument that there is a strong public policy
to promote the fair and timely payment of claims to third-party claimants. Inju-
ries and other forms of loss interrupt economic exchange and potentially shift
some of these burdens to extended families, friends, informal organizations
such as churches or aid societies, and social relief agencies. The tort-insurance
system facilitates a huge redistribution of funds from pooled premiums to
injured persons every year. In recognition of the vital importance of this trans-
fer of funds for social and economic reasons, most states have enacted financial
responsibility laws which have the practical effect of requiring licensed drivers
to carry insurance. Moreover, the practical realities of commercial life require
businesses to maintain a program of insurance that provides liability coverage.
Insurance quite simply is part of the fabric of life in America.
The insurance industry is heavily regulated to promote the public interest
in having insurance proceeds paid as promised.1 16 Insurance premiums are
subject to governmental oversight, both to protect the insured from unfair pric-
ing and to promote fiscal solvency. Marketing practices and contract formation
are subject to statutory and judicial regulation, as particularly evidenced by the
interpretive maxims that construe policies in accordance with the reasonable
expectations of the insured. Solvency is directly regulated through reserve
requirements, financial oversight, and the establishment of guarantee funds.
Finally, of course, states have adopted variations of the Uniform Unfair Claims
115 From a result-oriented perspective, one might argue that it makes more sense to expand
traditional doctrines, such as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the
doctrine of third-party intended beneficiary, to address the problem rather than creating a
"new" tort. However, it is clear to me that courts simply will not pour this new wine into the
old doctrinal vessels. Moreover, although I would not be against creative efforts to break
down these doctrinal limitations, I believe that the courts have identified very real conceptual
problems in doing so. Consequently, it is my judgment that the best means of holding insur-
ers accountable for their bad faith behavior is to persuade courts to adopt a new approach
that raises the merits of the policy questions directly, free from historical doctrinal con-
straints. Creating a "new" tort will not impress judicial conservatives, but this direct and
honest approach might have a chance for success.
116 For a succinct description of the regulation of insurance carriers, see PETER M. LENCSIS,
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) and ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDER-
STANDING INSURANCE LAW §§ 22-24 (2d ed. 1996).
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Practices Act that explicitly require insurers to treat insureds and claimants
honestly and fairly.
Indeed, it is obvious that legislatures and courts recognize the important
public function of insurance, and have embraced the public policy of maintain-
ing the integrity of the insurance industry by ensuring that promised indemnity
payments are made. A common thread in these expressions of public policy is
an acknowledgment of the power and sophistication of insurance carriers and a
desire to prevent abuse of this power by carriers withholding promised benefits.
Translated to the context of third-party claimants, Justice Timlin's dissent in
Krupnick succinctly highlights the important public policy implications of
allowing the liability insurer to avoid liabilities to claimants, and therefore
bears repeating.
It is clear, under our mandatory financial liability laws, as well as under California's
Insurance Code, that insurers exist and are allowed to do business in California not
only to provide their insureds with financial peace of mind, but to provide persons
injured by their insureds with financial recompense for their injuries in a reasonable
and good-faith manner.
[plublic policy mandates that insurance companies undertake the burden of fairly and
timely settling those claims as alleged here, when the insured's liability is reasonably
clear and the claimants' damages are reasonably ascertainable and which they have
contracted to cover, for a price, rather than allowing such costs and expenses encom-
passed by the claimed damages to fall on the shoulders of the injured claimants, and,
in some cases, on the doctors and hospitals whose bills will go unpaid, the welfare
systems to whom the injured parties may be forced to turn, and ultimately on the
taxpaying public.
117
My claim is that Justice Timlin's arguments are better employed to ground
liability directly in public policy, rather than using the public policy argument
to support tort liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Moving beyond traditional tort and contract doctrine and grounding tort
liability expressly in public policy considerations is not unprecedented. I
believe that this is precisely what courts did when they created a heightened
duty of good faith owed by liability insurers to their insureds, even though
courts were not forced to explain the public policy grounds for this cause of
action explicitly in light of the general contractual duty of good faith and fair
dealing that applied to the relationship between insureds and insurers.' 18 A
117 Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 85 (Ct. App. 1994)
(Timlin, J. dissenting).
118 Recently, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that holding insurers liable for
tort damages reflected the policy basis of the cause of action for insurance bad faith. "The
availability of tort remedies in the limited context of an insurer's breach of the covenant
advances the social policy of safeguarding an insured in an inferior bargaining position who
contracts for calamity protection, not commercial advantage." Kransco v. Am. Empire Sur-
plus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 2000) (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d
654 (1988) (distinguishing the contractual remedies available for breach of the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing in the employment setting from the tort remedies available for
insurance bad faith)).
The appellate court expressly relied on the public policy dimensions of the cause of
action for insurance bad faith in a recent case upholding the constitutionality of a statute
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better analogy is found in employment law, where the courts have developed
the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In this dynamic
setting, courts have recognized that traditional contract and tort principles are
inadequate to protect the public interest, and have responded by expressly
imposing tort liability to effectuate public policy.
An employer and employee obviously have a contractual relationship, and
also could easily be regarded as having the kind of relationship that might give
rise to special tort duties. However, in the absence of an express or implied
agreement about the duration of the employment relationship, courts tradition-
ally regard the contractual relationship to be terminable "at will," meaning that
either party may end the relationship at any time, for any reason, or for no
reason at all.t19 Moreover, although the contractual relationship gives rise to a
duty of good faith and fair dealing, the majority of courts have rejected the
insurance law model of importing additional substantive responsibilities into
extending the statute of limitations for certain claims arising out of the Northridge earth-
quake of 1994. The court summarized:
The field of insurance so greatly affects the public interest that the industry is viewed as a
"quasi-public" business, in which the special relationship between the insurers and insureds
requires special considerations. "'The insurer's obligations are ... rooted in their status as
purveyors of a vital service labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers of services affected with a
public interest must take the public's interest seriously, where necessary placing it before their
interest in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements .... As a supplier of a public service
rather than a manufactured product, the obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable
expectations of coverage. The obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of
decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold themselves
out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust must go private responsibility consonant with that
trust.'"
The Egan court recognized that the unequal relationship between the insured and insurers
demanded special remedies for breach of that public trust, such as tort remedies for the failure to
perform obligations promised in a policy and punitive damages. The court explained: "The
relationship of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced; the adhesive nature of insurance
contracts places the insurer in a superior bargaining position. The availability of punitive dam-
ages is thus compatible with recognition of insurers' underlying public obligations and reflects
an attempt to restore balance in the contractual relationship."
The significant public interest in the special relationship between the insured and insurer justifies
the availability of tort remedies, and distinguishes insurance contracts from other types of con-
tracts. Tort remedies remain unavailable in non-insurance contract cases. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 625-
26 (Ct. App. 2001). In a footnote, the court quoted from the Supreme Court opinion in
Foley: "Just as the law of contracts fails to provide adequate principles for construing the
terms of an insurance policy, the substantial body of law uniquely applicable to insurance
contracts is practically irrelevant to commercially oriented contracts. . . . These [unique]
features characteristic of the insurance contract make it particularly susceptible to public
policy considerations." Id. at 626 n.20.
119 For competing histories of the development of the "at will" rule in American, compare
Jay M. Fineman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976) with Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-
at-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP & LAB. L. 19 (1996) and
Deborah A. Ballam, The Traditional View on the Origins of the Employment-at-Will Doc-
trine: Myth or Reality?, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (1995).
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the contract and regarding breach of this duty as a tort. 120 Consequently, an
employee has no cause of action under common law principles if his employ-
ment is terminated suddenly and arbitrarily, despite the obvious fact that the
employee suffers injury in these circumstances.
Against the common law backdrop providing that employers have no lia-
bility for a "bad faith" or "wrongful" termination, a number of courts have
created a tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 12 1 In doing
so, courts expressly recognize that employers can abuse their substantial eco-
nomic power with the threat of termination to induce employees to act contrary
to established public policy. The tort grew out of cases that presented particu-
larly egregious facts. In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 396,122 the court determined that an employee could recover damages
when he was fired for refusing to testify falsely at a legislative hearing. The
court expressly based its analysis on the strong public policy against perjury.
Noting that perjury and the solicitation of perjury were crimes, that court
reasoned:
The threat of criminal prosecution would, in many cases, be a sufficient deterrent
upon both the employer and employee, the former from soliciting and the latter from
committing perjury. However, in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared
policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally
unlimited right to discharge an [at will] employee . . .when the reasons for the
dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury .... The public policy of this
state as reflected in the penal code sections referred to above would be seriously
impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of his refusal to
commit perjury. 123
This analysis quickly was adapted to a variety of contexts, including attempts
by employers to discourage employees from pursuing their statutory rights for
worker's compensation payments in the absence of a statutory remedy for
retaliation. 124
The emergence of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy represented a compromise between competing considerations. Courts
were unwilling to overrule the longstanding "at will" rule directly by recogniz-
ing that an employee who is terminated without just cause should be able to sue
in tort or contract for damages. However, courts also were unwilling to permit
employers to use their superior economic position under the "at will" regime to
influence employee behavior in ways that harmed not just the employee, but
the public at large. By creating a tort action that only protects the public inter-
est, and does not protect the employee in situations where the termination of
120 The watershed case is Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988), in
which the California Supreme Court explicitly compared the employment relationship to the
insurance relationship and determined that the heightened duty of good faith and fair dealing
that provided tort remedies in the insurance context should not be extended to the employ-
ment context.
121 See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER &
ELAINE W. SHOrEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 8.9-8.13 (2d ed. 1999).
122 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
123 Id. at 27.
124 The leading case to embrace the Petermann analysis in this setting is Frampton v. Cen-
tral Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
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employment might be unfair to the employee but does not harm the public
generally, the courts have fashioned a doctrinal solution that respects both of
the competing considerations.
The case law demonstrates that courts have been careful to restrict appli-
cation of this tort to promoting public policy. Recently, the California Supreme
Court held that an employee who alleged that he was constructively discharged
because he supported a co-worker's claim of sexual harassment could sue for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 125 The court emphasized the
"public" nature of the cause of action and held that employers can be liable
only in cases involving a clear constitutional or legislative declaration of funda-
mental public policy, concluding that:
[a] public policy exception carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are deline-
ated in constitutional or statutory provisions strikes the proper balance among the
interests of employers, employees and the public. The employer is bound, at a mini-
mum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in
their constitutions and statutes; so limited, the public policy exception presents no
impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law. Employees are pro-
tected against employer actions that contravene fundamental state policy. And soci-
ety's interests are served through a more stable job market, in which its most
important policies are safeguarded.
126
The court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action because the employer
clearly violated the legislatively enunciated public policy of preventing sexual
harassment when it allegedly sought to obstruct an investigation by threatening
the employee.
Nowhere in our society is the need greater than in protecting well motivated employ-
ees who come forward to testify truthfully in an administrative investigation of
charges of discrimination based on sexual harassment. It is self-evident that few
employees would cooperate with such investigations if the price were retaliatory dis-
charge from employment.
127
The court emphasized that the gravamen of the tort action is not that the
employee was unfairly fired, but rather that the employee was constructively
discharged in a manner that violated important public policies.
The public policy focus of the tort is highlighted by the line of cases that
restrict the cause of action to employees who have been discharged (actually or
constructively), and denies relief to employees who allege that they have been
demoted or otherwise treated unfairly for reasons that violate public policy.
Although the employee certainly suffers if she is demoted for an illegitimate
reason, the more subtle factual ambiguities presented in "wrongful demotion"
or "wrongful failure to hire" cases lead the majority of courts to conclude that
the public interest in preserving the managerial discretion of the at will rule
trumps the public interest in protecting employees who are discharged for rea-
sons that violate public policy.128 In addition, there are an abundance of cases
125 Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, Green v. Ralee
Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
126 Id. at 687-88.
127 Id. at 689.
128 See, e.g., White v. State, 929 P.2d 396 (Wash. 1997); Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing
Int'l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta Inc., 645
N.E.2d 877 (I11. 1994). But see Brigham v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 935 P.2d 1054 (Kan. 1997);
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in which employees have been fired for what appear to be callous, if not mali-
cious, reasons, but the courts hold that the employee may not recover damages
because the employer's conduct does not sufficiently implicate public
policy. '
29
The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy provides a
good model for imposing liability on insurance carriers when they deal with
third-party claimants in bad faith. Third-party claimants are not owed contrac-
tual or tort duties directly, just as at will employees are not owed duties regard-
ing the duration of their employment, but nevertheless an insurance carrier can
act in a manner that not only injures the claimant but also frustrates important
public policies. Courts should recognize the tort of bad faith settlement prac-
tices in violation of public policy, even if they choose not to reconsider the
baseline common law rule that a liability carrier owes no duties to a third-party
claimant.
I would not be adverse to a judicial declaration that the baseline common
law rule has outlived its usefulness, but this is highly unlikely in light of the
unanimous and continuing support for that rule.13 ° In the context of employ-
ment law, one author has argued that the tort of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy is part of an elaborate judicial dance around the real issue:
overruling the at will rule and recognizing a cause of action for termination of
employment without just cause."' However, courts are not ready to take the
next step and declare that unjust terminations in themselves violate public pol-
icy. One of the first wrongful discharge cases opened this possibility, but
courts have not taken this path.1 3 2 Just as the courts have embraced the public
Michael D. Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of the Camel: Extending the Public
Policy Exception Beyond the Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997).129 In Illinois, for example, although the supreme court wholeheartedly embraced the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, see Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876 (111. 1981), courts subsequently have narrowed the circumstances in which the
employer is deemed to have violated a clearly mandated public policy. See, e.g., Price v.
Carmack Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359 (I1l. 1985) (employee alleging that he was fired for
filing a claim under the employer-sponsored health insurance plan raised merely a personal
claim); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (employee
alleging that he was terminated for refusing to violate a federal anti-kickback statute did not
implicate the public policy of Illinois); McCluskey v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 498
N.E.2d 559 (fI1. App. Ct. 1986) (employee alleging that she was terminated solely for mar-
rying a co-worker did not state a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy in the absence of demonstrating that the employer's action significantly interfered
with the fundamental right to decide to marry). These cases demonstrate the emphasis that
courts place on finding a strong nexus with public policy rather than undermining the at will
rule by according rights to individual employees when they are discharged without just
cause. This is not to say that the contours of "public policy" are self-evident. For example,
a growing number of courts recognize that an employer's abuse of power regarding a viola-
tion of federal, as opposed to state, law triggers the public policy interests of the state. See,
e.g., Faulkner v. United Techs. Corp., 693 A.2d 293 (Conn. 1997); Tameny v. At. Richfield
Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
130 See supra note 113.
131 Cornielius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719 (1991).132 See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (holding that the public
interest warrants holding employers liable for terminating employment in bad faith, with
malice, or in retaliation).
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policy tort of wrongful discharge as an acceptable, intermediate doctrinal step
in employment law, I believe that courts could embrace the public policy tort of
bad faith settlement practices as an acceptable, intermediate step in insurance
law.
The public policy analysis under this new cause of action will raise as
many difficult interpretive and policy issues as any other common law action,
but it poses no unique or insuperable difficulties. Courts should have little
difficulty identifying the core public policies at stake in these cases. Unlike
Royal Globe, which sought to find a cause of action in the Unfair Claim Prac-
tices Act as a matter of statutory interpretation, courts would begin by regard-
ing the state insurance code as legislative pronouncement of public policy.
Additionally, statutes and regulations regarding deceptive business conduct or
deceptive advertising would reaffirm the legislature's identification of public
policies. Using the common law method of reasoned elaboration, courts would
carefully assess a claimant's allegations and determine if the interests at stake
were primarily personal, or whether they involve important questions of public
policy.
The insurance industry will argue forcefully that this new cause of action
will raise the price of liability insurance and perhaps even restrict its availabil-
ity in some markets or jurisdictions. The threat that every claim settlement
process will result in the injured party returning to the trough with a cobbled
together theory of bad faith that can survive dismissal should not be lightly
disregarded. If recognizing insurer liability would lead to large numbers of
cases being filed, all of which have at least "nuisance settlement value," then
the financial implications for insurers would be substantial. This poses a com-
bination of empirical and normative issues that are summarized by a decep-
tively simple question: Would recognition of the cause of action lead to higher
costs and inefficiencies to such a degree that important public policies would be
frustrated more than they would be advanced?
The nature of the liability goes a long way in providing some assurance
that the insurer's fears are unwarranted. Because the gravamen of the action is
the public interest rather than the personal interest of the claimant, the fact that
the claimant has a plausible claim of injury will not lead to an immediate settle-
ment value for the case. Again returning to the example of wrongful discharge
law as a guide, plaintiffs' lawyers have found it difficult to make out claims of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy even when their client has been
poorly treated and suffered substantial losses. The appellate courts have care-
fully enforced the public policy requirement precisely to ensure that the cause
of action does not interfere unduly with the public policy favoring managerial
flexibility. Securing appellate court decisions absolving them of liability does
not come cheap for employers, but in my experience most of these cases at the
appellate level involve employees who have been treated unfairly in some way.
Consequently, the situation today is that parties who have been wronged in
some way are unsuccessfully seeking to come within the scope of a relatively
restrictive cause of action. If the cost of this litigation promotes better treat-
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ment of employees not covered by the limited cause of action, there is not
necessarily a loss from the perspective of the public interest.'
33
There is no reason to expect that the experience in the insurance context
will be any different. If the collateral cost of recognizing the tort of bad faith
settlement practices is that third-party claimants who have been poorly treated
by insurers bring suits that can be dismissed only after expensive proceedings
establish that there is no public policy nexus, it is difficult to conclude that this
cost is "wasted." Plaintiffs lawyers will quickly learn that the cause of action
is not made simply by showing injury to their client, and so even unsuccessful
cases typically will involve plausible claims both that the claimant has suffered
a loss, and that the insurer acted in a manner contrary to public policy. Unlike
the employment law setting where wrongful discharge can' be inserted in a
complaint as one cause of action among many, the typical third-party claimant
will be able to assert only this single cause of action, although there may be
claims sounding in infliction of emotional distress and fraud as well. With bad
faith claims practices in violation of public policy being the only plausible hope
for recovery, plaintiffs' lawyers are unlikely to take many long-shot cases on a
contingency fee basis.
There is always the threat that completely unfounded claims will be
brought by aggressive attorneys hoping against the odds to add a windfall to the
underlying tort verdict or settlement. But unless there is some reason to believe
that fraudulent behavior will be more prevalent in the insurance setting, the
same argument would hold true for every cause of action. There certainly are
people who feign substantial injuries in slip and fall cases in order to milk the
system, but it does not follow that we should no longer hold property owners
liable for injuries because there is such fraud. The problem of "holdup" litiga-
tion is just not unique to the liability insurance setting.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, the public policy nature of this cause
of action suggests that the courts should develop rules and guidelines that medi-
ate the competing values at stake. Perhaps the most important step would be
for courts to preclude recovery of punitive damages by third-party claimants.
The specter of the $15,000 auto accident case turning into a multi-million dol-
lar punitive damages award for unfair claim practices surely would loom large
in insurers' minds. To the extent there is no indication that the "lottery" of
punitive damages would incrementally deter bad faith behavior sufficiently to
justify this potentially counter-productive incentive for claimants and their law-
yers, punitive damages would not be justified. This limitation of damages
would easily be justified on principled grounds because the Insurance Code of
every state establishes an administrative mechanism to identify and sanction
unfair claim practices in the event that the insurer's behavior is part of a pattern
of egregious behavior. With this administrative remedy in the background, and
with the likelihood that many successful cases will include consequential dam-
ages and damages for emotional distress injuries, it can easily be argued that
133 Should we really be too concerned about the increase of litigation that occurs when an
employee who has been fired solely because she married a co-worker has the temerity to
assert that this exercise of managerial power is in violation of important public policies? See
supra note 127.
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the public policy tort of bad faith settlement practices should not allow for
punitive damages of any kind.
Additionally, it may be prudent to employ a variation of the burden shift-
ing device used by courts in Title VII cases.' 3 4 A third-party claimant would
be required to plead and prove that (1) she made a legitimate claim against the
insured and provided sufficient documentation and other evidence to support
the claim, (2) she ultimately received payment on the claim either by court
judgment or settlement, and (3) that this payment was delayed or was below the
value of the claim, or both. Having established this prima facie case, the bur-
den of production would shift to the insurer to demonstrate how it valued the
claim and conducted the settlement or litigation of the claim. At this stage, the
court should engage in the presumption that the insurer did not act in bad faith.
Finally, the ultimate burden of proof would shift back to the claimant to
demonstrate that the insurer's defense of its actions are pre-textual in some
manner, and that the insurer in fact refused to pay a legitimate claim honestly
and fairly in an effort to maximize its own profits by taking advantage of the
claimant's situation. This burden-shifting approach would mean that bad faith
claims practices cases would not be easy to win, but in cases of true bad faith
rising to the level of a violation of public policy there still would be a reasona-
ble chance for the claimant to prevail and recover substantial damages.
Admittedly, many details and considerations have not been considered in
this essay. Rather than concluding this essay with a foolish attempt to delineate
in advance even greater details of case law not yet decided, in the spirit of the
Symposium I have included an Appendix that provides my suggestion of how a
judicial opinion might read if the court decided to commence this line of analy-
sis. If my hypothetical opinion ever were to be adopted by a court, it certainly
would be my favorite insurance law case.
134 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Tex. Dep't. Of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
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APPENDIX: My FAVORITE INSURANCE CASE
BEN A. PATSY, ET. AL. V. FAMILY INSURANCE BUREAU
SUPREME COURT OF PENN STATE
DECEMBER 1, 2001
MOOTZ, J.
All Justices concurred.
The plaintiffs, Ben. A. Patsy, Ima Patsy, and their minor children, sued
Family Insurance Bureau (FIB), alleging that they suffered economic harm and
emotional distress as a result of FIB's conduct in settling a claim brought by the
Patsies against FIB's insured. The Patsies were rear-ended by the insured and
suffered substantial personal injuries and property damage to their vehicle. In a
one-count complaint, the Patsies allege that FIB knew its insured was liable for
the accident and that they had suffered substantial losses, but that it neverthe-
less refused to settle the claim filed by the Patsies for more than two years.
They alleged further that FIB interposed groundless defenses and stalled the
negotiations and litigation solely for the purpose of inducing a lower settle-
ment. The Patsies contend that FIB took advantage of increasing economic,
psychological, and emotional pressures they experienced due to the fact that
their losses were uncompensated for several years despite the clear liability of
FIB's insured.
Discovery has brought to light a calculated and comprehensive scheme by
FIB to avoid paying the legitimate value of claims. 35 For over two decades
FIB set monthly caps on liability payments, and rewarded claims adjusters who
paid less than the market value for claims. Agents lied to their insureds about
the litigation, changed the contents of the claims files without any factual basis
to provide a pretextual basis for refusing to settle cases, and particularly
directed its fraudulent practices toward those persons - including the poor,
uneducated, and elderly - that FIB believed would be less likely to object or to
take legal action to pursue their rights. In furtherance of this scheme, FIB sys-
tematically harassed and intimidated claimants, their attorneys, and witnesses.
One document evidenced FIB's corporate policy of employing "mad dog
defense tactics" by using its sophistication and resources to overwhelm claim-
ants' attorneys by delaying litigation proceedings, making legal arguments and
objections that had no merit, destroying documents, and abusing the civil trial
process. Another document evidenced a "bonus" system for FIB's staff attor-
neys that awarded money, trips to Disney World, and trophies to attorneys who
litigated cases aggressively.13 6
135 These facts may appear far-fetched, but I am closely tracking (and to some extent
directly quoting) the summary of facts in a recent first-party bad faith case. See Campbell v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 WL 1246676, at *9-10 (Utah Oct. 19, 2001) (reinstat-
ing a punitive damages award of $145 million against State Farm for its "reprehensible
conduct," after the trial court had ordered remittitur to $25 million in punitive damages).
136 This frightening detail is drawn from the allegations in Crackel v. Allstate Insurance Co.
See Porter, supra note 33 in main text.
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The Patsies seek the following damages: the difference between the value
of their injuries and the amount that they were forced to accept in settlement,
the collateral financial injury proximately caused because they did not receive
fair compensation within a reasonable time of the accident, damages for the
emotional distress caused by mounting financial pressures, attorneys fees
incurred due to the delay, and punitive damages. The trial court entered sum-
mary judgment for FIB, reasoning that FIB owed no duty - whether contrac-
tual, tort, or statutory - to the Patsies, and therefore could not be held liable for
its conduct in settling the Patsies' claims against its insured.
We reverse and remand. We direct the trial court to reinstate the Patsies'
cause of action and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this
decision.
The trial court correctly stated that we consistently have held that liability
insurers owe no duties to third-party claimants, since insurers stand in the shoes
of their insureds and therefore are in an adversarial relationship with claimants.
Although in 1979 this court implied a private cause of action under the Unfair
Claims Practices Act, we subsequently concluded that the statute could not bear
this construction. A few claimants have prevailed under theories of fraud or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, but these theories reach only the
most egregious cases of insurer bad faith. We recently rejected a claimant's
attempt to use the recently expanded tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress to recover for bad faith conduct in the settlement process, signaling that
we would not twist this tort to serve as a replacement for the implied statutory
cause of action. In light of this doctrinal history, the trial court concluded that
the Patsies failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Today, we hold that important considerations of public policy require
insurers to bear the costs of their bad faith practices in settling claims. We
choose not to shoehorn insurer liability into preexisting tort or contract doc-
trine, inasmuch as general torts such as negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress do not comprehensively address the nature of the wrong against the public
in this setting. We do not mean to suggest that insurers are insulated from
liability under traditional tort and contract principles. If an insurer acts toward
a third-party claimant in a manner that gives rise to a cause of action sounding
in negligent infliction of emotional distress, then the insurer will be held
accountable for its tortious behavior. However, traditional contract and tort
theories are not sufficient to vindicate the important public policies at issue in
these cases.
We regard our action today as wholly consistent with the common law
process. Duties giving rise to tort liability are not etched in the heavens, await-
ing our apprehension of their timeless dictates. Rather, tort duties are imposed
in order to recognize important social interests in a (sometimes rapidly) chang-
ing economic, political, and social context. Traditional tort doctrine is inade-
quate to protect the public interest in the liability insurance context because
such doctrines can be both over-inclusive (by expanding liability too far and
introducing uncertainty and needless litigation) and under-inclusive (by failing
to protect the public interests fully). Consequently, we now hold that insurers
owe a duty to third-party claimants such as the Patsies not to engage in bad
faith settlement practices that violate public policy.
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We are not breaking entirely new ground with this decision. In the analo-
gous setting of employment law, we have created a cause of action sounding in
tort on behalf of "at will" employees who are terminated in violation of estab-
lished public policy, even in circumstances where the employee could assert no
claim for breach of contract or breach of a duty under general tort principles.
In these cases, we recognized that the public interest is advanced by subjecting
employers to tort damages when they use their superior economic power and
greater sophistication in an attempt to compel actions or forbearances by their
employees that injure the public. For example, when an employee alleged that
she was given an ultimatum either to work in an unsafe workplace or to be
fired, we held that the strong and pronounced public policy that employers
must maintain a safe workplace justified holding the employer liable in tort for
attempting to use its unmatched power to terminate an employee as a tool for
thwarting this important public policy.
We hold that liability insurers are liable in tort if they act in bad faith
when handling a claim by a third party. Insurers act in bad faith if they seek to
avoid obligations of their insured that cannot be contested honestly and legiti-
mately, for the purpose of using their superior negotiating position to pressure
the third party into accepting an inadequate settlement rather than spending the
time and resources necessary to obtain a judgment against the insured. This
bad faith conduct might best be characterized as a form of "reverse insurance
fraud," in which the insurance carrier seeks to pay less than the legitimate value
of the claim, even though its state-approved premiums are premised on paying
the full value of claims. Under our decision, there will be no liability if an
insurer investigates the claim and then challenges the third party's allegations
of liability or claim of damages in good faith, even if the verdict obtained by
the claimant ultimately vindicates her position. The bad faith conduct that is
injurious to the public is the insurer's use of specious and pretextual arguments
to avoid settlement and its use of delay in payment to exert pressure on the
claimant to accept less than the claimant could reasonably expect to receive for
her injuries.
Because a liability insurer steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor in order to
resolve a claim asserted by a third party, there is an adversarial relationship
between the insurer and the third-party claimant. Nothing in our opinion today
requires insurers to place the interests of the claimant above the interests of
their insured. If an accident leaves a claimant with losses of approximately
$2000-$5000, but the claimant makes a demand for the policy limit of $50,000,
the insurer is entirely justified in rejecting the offer and pushing the matter to
trial. The delay in payment in such a case is occasioned by the claimant's
unreasonable demands, rather than the insurer's bad faith conduct. On the
other hand, if an accident where liability is clear leaves a claimant with losses
of approximately $10,000-s15,000, it will almost certainly be bad faith for the
insurer to refuse to offer more than $2000 to settle the matter. In this case, the
insurer would not be vindicating its insured's rights, but rather would be seek-
ing to improve its own profitability by refusing to pay the fair value of claims
that it has agreed to pay on behalf of its insured.
We do not attempt to hold insurers to a detailed affirmative standard of
good faith insurance practices, since that would more properly be the subject of
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legislative and regulatory action. Moreover, the varieties of factual scenarios in
which the insurer might act in bad faith under the principles announced in this
decision prevent us from specifying in detail the conduct that will give rise to
liability. This is not unusual in tort law, of course, as the general standard of
negligence is creatively adapted to endless factual scenarios. Nevertheless, as
with general negligence, we believe that over time courts will identify certain
conduct that almost always constitutes actionable bad faith. Such conduct
might include: interposing defenses that the insurer knows are factually
groundless, seeking to delay settlement negotiations or litigation solely for the
purpose of capitalizing on financial or emotional pressures that the claimant is
experiencing as a result of the loss in question, and using deceptive tactics
designed to obtain an unreasonably low settlement because the claimant does
not understand her rights, such as by providing an immediate payment for only
part of the loss in exchange for the claimant unknowingly executing a general
release. As with all common law causes of action, the contours of the tort of
bad faith claim settlement practices will evolve on a case-by-case basis and
remain sensitive to social, economic, and business developments.
We regard the public interests at stake to be sufficiently important to rec-
ognize this new cause of action against liability insurers. The legislature has
enacted a detailed insurance code designed to protect the public, and almost
from the inception of the insurance industry there has been substantial govern-
mental oversight to protect the public from harm. In particular, of course, the
legislature has enacted a detailed statute proscribing certain unfair practices in
the settlement of claims, and the Insurance Commissioner is empowered to levy
fines to punish this behavior. In addition, the legislature has acknowledged the
public importance of insurance by enacting financial responsibility laws for
those who drive automobiles. Finally, there is a consistent theme in this court's
insurance jurisprudence that compensating injured third parties is one of the
important determinants in how we construe the insurance relationship. There
can be no doubt that there is a strong public interest in the efficient and fair
settlement of claims made against insurers by injured third parties.
This public interest is not necessarily co-extensive with the personal inter-
ests of the third-party claimant. The claimant's only interest is to obtain the
maximum payment as quickly as possible. However, the public interest is best
served when insurers act reasonably and fairly, which will not always result in
immediate payments of claims. Inflated claims and insurance fraud harm the
public interest by increasing the cost of insurance, and insurers should be
encouraged to protect against this behavior. Public policy requires insurers to
pay claims only when liability has been reasonably established by a timely
investigation, and only to the extent of the fair and reasonable value of the
losses. Additionally, public policy requires that insurers deal with claimants
fairly and honestly, but does not justify imposing fiduciary obligations on
insurers in these dealings. Consequently, there will be many instances in which
a claimant is dissatisfied with the handling of the claim, but nevertheless the
insurer will not have acted in a manner that violates public policy.
We emphasize that liability for bad faith insurance settlement practices in
violation of public policy is conceptually and factually distinct from an
insurer's liability to its insured for bad faith refusal to settle within policy lim-
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its. Because it has complete control over the litigation, an insurer can expose
its insured to an excess verdict by refusing to settle within the policy limit. In
recognition of the inherent conflict of interest, even if the insurer honestly
believes that the verdict will be within the policy limit, we do not permit it to
gamble with the insured's money when there is a substantial possibility that the
gamble will not pay off. Under well-established principles, we insulate the
insured from any financial loss in these circumstances by requiring the insurer
to pay the full verdict. In contrast, a refusal to settle within policy limits does
not necessarily harm the public interest in a manner that justifies holding the
insurer liable to a third-party claimant. For example, if the insurer honestly and
reasonably rejects the claimant's demand for the policy limit as unsupported by
the facts, the insurer has breached no duty to the third-party claimant even in
the event of an excess verdict. On the other hand, if the insurer refuses to settle
within policy limits when liability and damages are reasonably clear, stone-
walling the third-party claimant into protracted discovery and a full trial, the
insurer has breached its duty to the claimant regardless of whether there is an
excess verdict. Payment of the verdict does not fully compensate the claimant,
even when the excess verdict is fully funded by the insurer due to its liability to
its insured for bad faith. In this situation, the claimant is entitled to recover
consequential damages caused by the delay in settlement, including damages
for emotional distress. The third-party claimant very well might suffer substan-
tial consequential financial losses if its legitimate claim remains unpaid for
years. It is these collateral losses, in large part, that implicate the public
interest.
We are mindful that our decision today might be regarded as an invitation
for frivolous litigation by claimants seeking to supplement their settlement or
verdict with additional funds from the insurer. We emphasize that the public
policy ground for liability restricts the scope of this tort remedy only to conduct
that harms the public interest. Delay in paying a claim, in itself, is not actiona-
ble, even if the delay injures the claimant. The public interest is implicated
only when the delay in payment occurs despite reasonably clear liability result-
ing in damages that can be calculated with reasonable certainty. Bad faith set-
tlement of an insurance claim in violation of public policy is not necessarily an
intentional tort, since it is plausible that gross or reckless indifference to the
interests of the claimant could implicate public policy, but liability clearly
requires more than inadvertent negligence caused by honest mix-ups or even
incompetence that delays processing a claim. Determining whether the insurer
is culpable presents a question of fact for the trier, but we fully expect that the
courts will ensure that only cases with potential merit will survive dismissal
and summary judgment.
Turning to the facts presented in this case, we reverse the trial court's
dismissal of the action. The plaintiffs have expressly pleaded that the defen-
dant knew its insured was liable and the value of the loss, but nevertheless
persisted in delay and obfuscation for the purpose of inducing a low settlement.
Such conduct, if proved at trial, is injurious to the well-established public pol-
icy of this state and gives rise to liability. The plaintiffs have alleged that they
suffered financial loss, emotional distress, and increased attorneys' fees. The
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plaintiffs may be compensated for these items of damages, subject to sufficient
proof at trial.
The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages, but we hold as a matter of law
that punitive damages cannot be awarded in this action. There can be no doubt
that the allegations against FIB concern reprehensible and malicious behavior
that cannot be tolerated. Nevertheless, we are hesitant to permit punitive dam-
ages for the tort action that we recognize today. First, we acknowledge that
FIB could have reasonably believed under previous case law that its extreme
behavior would not give rise to any manner of liability to the Patsies. We
decline to permit an award of punitive damages in the case that announces a
change in previous law to recognize liability. Moreover, the regulatory regime
established by the Unfair Claims Practices Act represents the legislature's
determination of when it is appropriate for the Commissioner of Insurance to
sanction insurer wrongdoing. In light of this regulatory mechanism for impos-
ing punishment, we restrict plaintiffs to compensation for their losses when
they bring suit for bad faith insurance settlement practices in violation of public
policy, reserving our authority to revisit this limitation on damages if it appears
that administrative enforcement is not advancing the public interest and in the
absence of a clear legislative determination that the Commissioner has the sole
authority to award such damages.
Reversed and remanded, with direction.
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